Article by Ms. Nena Skopljanac, political scientist/Media research, Medienhilfe Ex-Jugoslawien, published in german translation in FriZ, Friedenszeitung, August 1998

Back and forth in war and peace

With the events in Drenica in the last February weekend and the beginning of March, Kosov@ conflict drew a full attention of the international community. And again - like it had happened in 1991 with the beginning of a bloody breakdown of the former Yugoslavia, and especially in 1992 after the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina had started - the world, in particular Europe, was surprised, shocked, and caught unprepared.

Since the autumn last year, it was obvious that the Kosov@ conflict entered its new phase with strong potentials to turn into an open escalation. Namely, the fact that the Kosov@ issue had been completely dropped out from the Dayton Accord’s agenda influenced certain changes in Kosov@ Albanian public and on the social and political scene.

From passive pacifism...

Large majority of Kosov@ Albanians had expected that the Kosov@ issue would be taken into consideration and that their political demands would be fulfilled. Unfulfilled hopes and expectations brought an enormous feeling of a frustration, being abandoned and in a way betrayed from the international community. Kosov@ Albanians found themselves in a crevice of two things. One was the knowledge that their non-violent means of struggle were verbally warmely from world power-holders, who, in the end, had a decisive role in reaching a solution, but that their action in solving the conflict was completely missing. On the other hand, the brutality that the Serbian regime have for the years applied in a large-scale and mass violation of their human rights became unbearable.

The policy of non-violent resistance, in a form that it was designed and carried out by the leading political party Democratic League of Kosov@ (LDK) and its leader Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, started being questioned and, afterwards, more and more criticised as being too passive, not well-thought, and thus not fruitful and even counter-productive for the goals it was aimed at. The critics were getting in their sharpness and their carriers were broadening with the time: from some intellectual circles and groupings on the alternative scene, over all relevant opposition political parties (most of all, the largest Parliamentary Party after Adem Demaqi came for its leader), till the student movement. Dominant alternatives that were offered still were in a line with non-violent approach, but were arguing for bringing in some components of openly practised mass-scale social and political activism and citizens disobedience. Accordingly, mass non-violent protests took place in the end of the last year.

... to active bellicism

In the end of November, Kosov@ Liberation Army (UCK), openly came to the public stage. Although it appeared a few years before and in the statements sent to some media took first responsibilities for killings (mostly of police personnel and Albanians whom they considered as being "loyal" to or "collaborating" with the Serbian regime) already in 1996, in this period it started changing its strategy: both in a way that their armed operations were carried out and in a manner it addressed to the public. Individual killings were replaced with direct fights with smaller police units. Besides, it came out of underground as its members for the fist time publicly presented themselves on the burial of their killed combatant and addressed to those present. During the next few months, till Drenica events, UCK did not grow into some more decisive factor on Kosov@ Albanian scene, but still had maintained continuity in occasional low-scale armed clashes with the police.

These UCK's strategic changes influenced new moments in Milosevic's policy towards Kosov@. For every responsible politician who cares about the interests of the country whose president he is this would be a clear sign that the status-quo could not be kept any longer, and that the changed circumstances urgently need well-thought and cleverly designed political means to resolve the conflict which threatened to explode into an open violence. But, Milosevic did exactly the opposite. The police stroke with a full strength in Drenica area, with the pretext that "each sovereign state" has "a legal right" to fight against "terrorism". What very soon came out was that most of the police's actions were targeted at perpetrating massacres against civilians, and not at fighting against UCK.

Milosevic’s power-calculation

Milosevic, of course, knew that one of the consequences would be launching of UCK on the post of the most important factor on Kosov@ Albanian scene. And that is exactly what his intention was. There are several reasons for this. First, he was faced with serious problems that were endangering his position of unquestionable leader, most of all developments in Montenegro and catastrophic social and economic situation which affected almost the entire population. Second, although the students and citizens protests in the end of 1996 and beginning of 1997 did not brought desirable results, still parts of the society which stayed in opposition to the regime remained broader than before. Even being particularised, without some seriously developed platforms and not present in public, they carried latent potential to endanger his power when some appropriate circumstances occur.

Whenever he was in position that his rule was in danger, Milosevic was playing the same game: neutralising of disobedient and competitors by homogenising of Serbian nation in order to gain plebiscite support for his policy. To be able to succeed in this, he needed some issue that could be presented as something directly endangering "Serbian national interest" and threatening "nation’s survival". By doing exactly what was contributing that UCK grows from a small armed group/s into a real guerrilla with a large support of Kosov@ Albanian population, Milsevic was actually strengthening his position of a sole leader capable to handle the problem. Besides, consequences on the Kosov@ Albanian political scene are achieved as well. The key political players are disunited and the position of Ibrahim Rugova is significantly weakened and his post as legitimate representative of Kosov@ Albanians in future negotiations is seriously questioned. Finally, he created for the moment some broader manoeuvre space towards the international community, for whom at present UCK, and not him, represents the most difficult issue to deal with in order to reach some solution through political means.

Diffuse base...

From small groups of 200-300 members in the beginning of March, UCK meanwhile grew into the guerrilla movement for whose membership estimations reach even 30,000. However, it represents rather heterogeneous structure, gathering members of different political groupings and with various levels of organising. The most diffuse, and probably the largest, is the ground level. It predominantly consists of male villagers in the areas of UCK’s operations who are capable for partaking in armed actions. and who joined UCK in order to more successfully defend their villages against the police attacks. They do not have one common ideology or particular political platform, but are rather supporters of political options of various parties.

Social basis for recruiting UCK members also represent Kosov@ Albanian diaspora, partly students population who came back to their residence places after semester had been finished, former officers of Yugoslav Peoples Army, former political prisoners (most of whom were in jails during the 80’s because of taking part or organising mass demostrations in 1981 and those sentenced in that time because of other activites marked from the authorities as "separatrist", and to a lesser extent members of underground political groupings in 60’s and 70’s) and members of smaller political groupings that actually established UCK. The last ones are of a special importance within UCK’s structure as they are in the top of hierarchy and therefore make a decisive influence, both in planning of future armed operations and in defining political issues. It is important to note that many among these former political prisoners had since recently been members of Rugova’s LDK, and left it after the "radical wing" was marginalised in the beginning of the year. Namely, on the LDK Convention in February, the new main and executive board were elected and not a single previous member who was considered as belonging to this "radical stream" was re-elected. This certainly had consequences of dissolving of party ranks on lower levels as well. Finally, a part of members established a new party: Albanian Democratic Movement, led by academitian Rexhep Qosia.

... ideological leadership...

According to the statement of its spokesman Jakup Krasniqi, UCK was built up in 1994 after the military wing of Volksbewegung Kosova (LPK) - Kosov@ Albanian political party based in Switzerland - had previously been established (1992-93). However, the ideological background of UCK comes from the founding political groupings of LPK - underground organisations with Marxist-Leninist-Enver Hoxha and similar orientation, that were established in 60’s and 70’s. After being severely cracked down from the former Yugoslavia’s regime, some of their members left into a political emigration. Those who stayed in the country were pushed on the margins when Kosov@ Albanian alternative scene and new political parties started being established in 1989, and majority of them joined LDK.

... and paternalistc structures

After stabilising the positions on the battlefield in the area of Drenica and Malisevo, UCK started with establishing of local authorities and its political structures.

The parallel social system (education, health, etc.) that Kosov@ Albanians started to build up in 1991, as well as local branches of political parties, were in the rural areas based on the traditional structures of Albanian village families and village communities. It contains of very patriarchal way of life and strictly hierarchical process of decision-making in which only heads of families have a position to give a word.

Thus, a support that UCK got from the population living on the territory it controlled could not be possible without approval through this traditional structures. That means that UCK’s establishment of the system of the local authorities actually presented a take-over of already existing local structures under its control. Some analysts in Pristina expressed their doubts that e.g. leaderships of political parties in Pristina have influence on their local branches in that area. However, only Adem Demaqi, the president of the Parliamentary Party, admitted publicly that it happened with his party.

... Military hopes...

During the last five months, UCK managed to become one of decisive factors on Kosov@ Albanian scene. Through its rather successful military actions it managed within a short time to create a "liberated territory", in the central area of Kosov@ containing of Drenica region and municipality Malisevo. Besides, it has also a certain level of a control in some other parts of Kosov@, especially in rural areas around town of Decan (where the village Juniku is). Successes in armed clashes with Serbian police that UCK till recently had, created an enormously positive image of its members among majority of Kosov@ Albanians, especially those living in the areas affected by the war: seen as brave, courageous, not hesitating to give their lives for the freedom of the homeland, protectors and defenders of the Albanian civilians.

About UKC started to be spoken with great enthusiasm and respect. Each victory was met with hopes that it was one step forward towards fulfilment of a long lasting dream for independence. Each killed UCK member was honoured as a hero... Kosov@ was brought into the focus of international politics, it became a regular part of headlines of all relevant international media, and the Serbian regime got a hit back. Majority of Kosov@ Albanians started to believe in a new illusion. An illusion that Kosov@ conflict could be solved with passive non-violent movement, was replaced with another one: that it can be solved by victory on a battlefield.

... and political power-struggles

UCK was met with ambivalent reactions from the Kosov@ Albanian political parties and their leaders. LDK and its leader Ibrahim Rugova were persistent in saying either that they knew nothing about it - neither who its members and leaders were, nor what platform they had - or that it was most probably related to activities of Serbian Intelligence Service.

Mr. Rugova for the first time accepted the existence of UCK in mid June, when he, after coming back from the visit to USA, stated at the press conference that the UCK had to be "put under a control of Albanian political forces" and that it had to "take responsibilities for its actions". Mr. Rugova waited till UCK took control of around one third of Kosov@ territory only to accept its existence, and not to speak about establishing contacts with UCK and trying to influence its plans and decisions. Certainly this approach was the most harmful to LDK and Mr. Rugova particularly, and was one of the strongest reasons for a rapid loss of the influence among many of Kosov@ Albanians. UCK spokesman Jakup Krasniqi several times up to now openly expressed negative stance towards Rugova’s policy, which could be an indicator that within UCK the influence of people who still saw Rugova as the legitimate representative of Kosov@ Albanians was declining. By doing so, Mr. Rugova gave an open space to his strongest political opponents - especially Adem Demaqi and Rexhep Qosja - to try to gain the post of the "political wing of UCK" and thus improve their political rating. The both did not miss the chance, but the biggest consequence was that the Albanian political scene was completely split which made it additionally difficult to reach consensus about a common platform.

Back to politics?

Recent serious defeats of UCK, will hopefully strengthen its stream which is ready to accept negotiations as a mean of the conflict’s solution. Kosov@ Albanian political representatives are hardly working on formulating a common platform which will include all existing factors on Kosov@ Albanian scene. The elaboration of concrete proposals how to approach to the negotiating side, as well as of those related to a future status of Kosov@, should follow. And they will not have to start from the beginning. A considerable effort from Kosov@ Albanian (and Serb as well) experts, intellectuals and people from NGO scene has already been invested. In a serial of different locally and internationally organised meetings, conferences and seminars, a whole spectrum of various elaborations has already been developed. They are waiting to be taken as political projects to be discussed, modified or combined through a process of reaching of a consensus, and realised.

Nena Skopljanac, political scientist/Media research, Medienhilfe Ex-Jugoslawien