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International Crisis Group ICG: Balkans Briefing
Pristina/Washington/Brussels, 10 October 2000
REACTION IN KOSOVO TO KOSTUNICA'S VICTORY
I. SUMMARY
While the world watched in fascination as mass demonstrations in Belgrade
toppled Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic from power, Kosovo-where Milosevic
had committed some of his worst crimes-had an almost eerie air of normalcy.
On the night Milosevic fell, cafes were full and the usual crowd of young people
strolled along Pristina's central artery, Mother Theresa Street. But
Pristina's surface indifference masked serious unease about events in Serbia and
especially about the swelling international welcome for newly elected President
Vojislav Kostunica. Kosovo Albania's political circles, opinion leaders, and
public, which for long had a head-in-the-sand approach toward the rise of the
democratic opposition in Belgrade, are only beginning to come to grips with the
changed political landscape in the Balkans caused by Milosevic's fall.
Initial reactions to Kostunica's election suggest the radicalisation of Kosovo
Albanian opinion on issues such as co-operation with the international community
and Kosovo's future status. If NATO governments go too far toward
welcoming the new Serb democratic forces without sending some positive and
reassuring signals to Kosovo, the already evident sense of impatience among
Kosovo Albanians with aspects of the international mission could grow and
eventually turn dangerous.
Over the next year or so, the international community should seek to turn the
attention of both the Kostunica government and the Kosovo Albanian community
toward confidence-building measures and dialogue that could lay the foundation
for diplomatic engagement at the proper time. Over the longer run, the
international community should recognise that Milosevic's departure makes it
imperative to accelerate plans to create interim Kosovo-wide democratic
institutions, with elections held no later than early 2001, and after that to
move promptly to create a clearly understood roadmap for resolving Kosovo's
final status.
II. PUBLIC REACTION
As the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) put together its well-planned
campaign of elections and street protests that on 5 October led to Milosevic's
downfall, Kosovo Albanian political leaders and media acted as if events in
Serbia were occurring on another planet. The day before Milosevic fell a
senior official of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) revealed that his party
had "made a decision not to decide" on taking a stance on events in
Belgrade and added that, "No matter which party wins in Serbia, it will be
a matter of complete indifference to Kosovo."
Most Kosovo Albanian papers reported events in Belgrade in a low-key fashion,
usually in small articles drawn from wire service reports that were buried deep
inside the papers. Not until 6 October, the day after Milosevic fell, did
the Belgrade story make the front pages of some Kosovo Albanian papers. On
the night Milosevic fell, journalists at a Kosovo news agency newly formed under
international auspices refused to cover events in Belgrade at all.
Journalists at the Kosovo evening television news program initially adopted a
similar approach, until a foreign colleague galvanised them into using available
live television feeds to produce more normal coverage of breaking events and to
arrange a program of commentary by a couple of respected Pristina "talking
heads." The Kosovo television journalists, however, rebelled at a possible
interview with Kostunica, which could have been arranged live for Pristina
virtually as the new president was assuming power and would have presented an
opportunity to question the new president on issues of interest to Kosovo.
Similarly, all prominent Kosovo Albanian politicians, except Alliance for
Kosovo's Future (AAK) head Ramush Haradinaj, refused an offer to appear on
Kosovo television to discuss events in Belgrade.
The most extreme example of this "What, me worry?" approach was
provided by Bota Sot, one of the largest circulation dailies in Kosovo.
Its chief editor, Bajrush Morina, noted that he was carrying no news about
events in Belgrade because Serbia is an "enemy" country. According to
Morina, Kosovo Albanians were more interested in what was happening in world
centres such as New York, Geneva, and London than in Belgrade. Asked
whether he had not noticed and reported the enthusiastic reaction of leaders in
these world centres to events in Belgrade, Morina replied that he edited out of
his paper's coverage the parts of the foreign leaders' statements with which he
disagreed. In a conversation which occurred a few days before the
climactic events in Belgrade, Morina said that even if Milosevic fell he would
not report it and, indeed, when Milosevic did fall the readers of Bota Sot
remained blissfully unaware of the event, reading on the front page instead a
tribute to martyred Albanian guerrilla leader Adem Jashari.
Only on 7 October, two days after Milosevic fell, did Kosovo Albanian political
leaders or parties begin to make public statements on events in Belgrade and
even then these were largely provoked by reaction to United Nations Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK) chief Bernard Kouchner's efforts to enlist Albanian support for
beginning a dialogue with Kostunica on Kosovo. Although most Albanian
leaders professed to be pleased with the democratic changes in Serbia, they also
expressed great scepticism about Kostunica's approach toward Kosovo and
considerable unease about what they clearly regarded as an unseemly rush by the
international community to embrace Kostunica without seeking some actions with
respect to Kosovo, especially the release of the approximately one thousand
Albanian prisoners held in Serb jails. All Kosovo leaders also emphasised
their view that democratic changes in Serbia had no direct connection with
Kosovo, which they universally said would only be satisfied with complete
independence from Belgrade.
There has been little strategic thinking among Kosovo Albanian political leaders
about how to respond to the advent of a new regime in Belgrade. As usual,
however, Veton Surroi, the respected owner of Kosovo's leading daily, Koha
Ditore, is well out in front. In a long editorial article on the
implications for Kosovo of Milosevic's fall, Surroi wrote that the fall of
Slobodan Milosevic was part of the historical processes that would make Kosovo
free of Serbia forever. He called for a parallel process of building
democracy in Serbia and Kosovo and set out a strategy for dealing with the new
reality that included close co-ordination with Montenegro on future relations
with Belgrade, prompt introduction of a market economic system, and setting up a
functioning system of democratic self-government at the Kosovo level after the
October municipal elections. Surroi said it was wrong for the
international community to believe that Kosovo could be part of a democratic
Serbia but urged Kosovo Albanians to defer discussion of Kosovo's final status
until later.
full
report by ICG here
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