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KOHA SUMMARY
No. 152, 11 June 1997
INTERVIEW: ALEKSANDAR TIJANIC, Editor in Chief
of "Gradjanin"
"KOSOVA'S PROBLEM IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SOLVE!
Interviewed by DUKAGJIN GORANI / Belgrade
Before we started the interview with Aleksandar Tijanic,
ex-information minister born i Gjakov‰, journalist and
columnist for at least twenty ex-Yugoslav newspapers and now
founder and editor in chief of the daily "Gradjanin",
the protests of doctors, social workers and God knows who else
were starting on Belgrade's Terazije... The one that deeply knew
Serbia's era of socialist-communist media, as well as the best
interpreter of the Serbian version of the plot that followed
Milosevic's famous "Eighth Session" - a person that
Belgrade considers as the only man who got rich from journalism -
despite the fact that he walked alternatively across the ledge of
social disobedience and the beneficial flirts with the regime,
seems to (still) achieve success through the publishing of a
daily with an exclusive urban profile, and who, after everything
was over, was able to take a look at the Serbian common protests
taking place in extreme heat, from the coolness of his office on
the fourth floor... KOHA: You are now leading Belgrade's newest
daily, "Gradjanin". You switched a large number of
newspapers, you were at the head of a TV station, and you gave up
the post of information minister of Serbia... How would you
portray the media situation at this present time? TIJANIC: I am
known for thinking that Serbian journalism is in a deep crisis,
since at least 15 years now. I think that Serbia's journalism was
adequate only during the last years of communist rule and that it
has drowned in a terrible crisis, from which it hasn't been able
to escape in the post communist era - or neo-communist, if you
wish. I think that this crisis happened for two main reasons: the
first of which is that the press in Serbia was used in order to
homogenise the people, i.e. Serbs, since it was created only for
the intentions and functions of that people. The second reason
was the truth that this was an era in which Serbia's middle class
was completely destroyed, that I perceive as the dramatic result
of Yugoslavia's destruction, as far as Serbia is concerned. The
conflicts or the destruction in Yugoslavia wouldn't be as bloody
as they are, were it not for the ruin of the social middle
classes of nearly all of former Yugoslav republics, and the way
it reacted towards the social unrest. The middle class
destruction ended with the low cultural level of the people and
with the reduction of knowledge. Today, we, the Serbs, are a
population that manipulates with a very low level of knowledge,
that's why the Serbian press reflects such a bad intellectual,
mental and social rating, of the country that it belongs to.
KOHA: Do you think that the middle class existed while Tito was
alive? There is an explanation according to which, it was
generated in order to provide a synthetic social balance...
TIJANIC: I think that all of the Yugoslav peoples had a very
strong middle class. I think that of all south and eastern
European countries - including Greece, and up to a point Turkey -
Tito's Yugoslavia had the strongest middle class, created with
that brilliant method, through which Tito was capable to keep the
social peace. All those foreign credits were split in two parts:
half of it was given to the state and was spent for the military
plus other huge representative objects - and the other half was
given to the people. In that time there were workers that owned
cars, villas, passports, that travelled worldwide; they were able
to provide education for their children in nearly any faculty.
Workers' children became doctors or engineers in short time and
with ease. That class, I think, could have turned into an embryo
for Yugoslavia's democratisation. But it dissolved easily into
the lowest possible level during the homogenising process of the
people, adapting to the everyday political standards and tasks,
in the struggle for the national question within the proper
nation. It was used and left aside through a "social
counterrevolution" after which, not the best, but the most
able and unscrupulous became the social and material elite, while
everybody else dropped to the lowest level of social ranking.
KOHA: It seems as if you think that this is the ideal time for
another Tito... TIJANIC: I'm going to say something that Serbs
aren't going to like that much, and that is the fact that they
had a good life with Tito. His whole personal guard was made up
of Serb officers; his assistants lived in Belgrade, he lived in
Belgrade... Whether we like it or not, we had a nice life during
his reign. I think that all of Yugoslavia's peoples needs a
charismatic leader and that democracy is not suitable for
Balkan's peoples and that it won't function until the half of the
next century. In the Balkans, it expresses only the bad sides and
that is one of the dramas of the people on the peninsula. KOHA:
You mean the constant siding towards anarchy? TIJANIC: Not only
towards anarchy, but also based on the "for everything and
everyone permit", it is the unscrupulous always triumph, the
ones that spread racism, that favor their nation proclaiming it's
historical or biological importance. And all this always ends up
with the defeat of all those that proclaim tolerance, peace and
real values of democracy. So, I think that nowadays, Serbs think
of Milosevic as a multi-party Tito, as a national Tito. KOHA: How
far does such an understanding go? TIJANIC: Milosevic has many
advantages when compared to the opposition. The Serbian
opposition is not united. I think that Serbs do not have lists of
national interests and aims, on which the regime and the people
could agree. And which in some way the Albanians achieved. They
only differ when it comes to the arrangement - if their aim is to
be accomplished at a slower or faster pace. On the contrary,
Serbs don't have that. One of the Serbian dramas is that they
don't have a perception of the time passing. We've wasted ten
years and I think we're going to waste another ten, until we
catch the tail of Europe's development. Serbs will wait for the
solutions to Kosova's issue, to relations with Vojvodina and
Montenegro, as well as for relations with NATO (that would put
Serbia in the same position as Bulgaria, Rumania, Macedonia and
Albania)... Not to mention Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia... So, as a
nation, we have many problems and I regret to say that - hiding
them under the carpet - isn't a solution. KOHA: Particularly,
Kosova's problem... TIJANIC: Since we're talking about it, I
don't think there many problems that can't be solved. And I also
think that there is no acceptable solution (for both sides) of
Kosova's issue. I personally think that Kosova's issue began as
an ideological issue and not a national one - but having human
rights in mind, the new Albanian intelligentsia turned the
ideological issue into a national one, and in the end - with
great skill turned the human and national rights into aspirations
and political aims! That was done with great skill and Serbs were
not able to oppose them because of two reasons: first, because
they underestimated the international public's influence towards
the events in Kosova, and, secondly, because they underestimated
the contacts that Albanian youths set up in Europe and other
parts of the world. So Serbs didn't have a solution for that.
They still don't have one. That's how Albanians managed to make
an issue of their question in front of the whole world, without
the solving of which, Serbia is bound to have a very difficult
time recommencing it's position in the international community. I
don't see a way in which Serbia could solve Kosova's issue, since
it has already turned it into a territorial issue. Serbia
couldn't make the Albanians split into pro-Yugoslavs and
nationalists; the Albanian nation is one of the most compact
nations in the Balkans, never mind the small differences which
they have between themselves, they always seem to stick
together... KOHA: From this point of view, the difficult
situation in Albania must still be analyzed... TIJANIC: I think
that the events in Albania have somehow built a wall between
Kosova and Albania, but any common Albanian would say that the
situation in Kosova is a lot easier to bear. In Albania the whole
state is destroyed. Not only the national rights, one can't even
guarantee people's elementary security. KOHA: Kosova Albanians
consider that such things, for decades now, aren't guaranteed
even in Kosova. TIJANIC: ...Of course, one shouldn't think that
the chaos in Albania is going to last forever - what can easily
happen with Kosova. I also think that Kosova's Albanians are
beginning to realise that they have to reach some agreement about
living together. I'm not pleased with the situation in Albania at
all, because I think that it could cause serious problems to
Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, etc., but I think that the turmoil
will cease with time. In the meantime, us Serbs and you Albanians
could try and find a formula that I wouldn't call solution, but
cease-fire. I think that one of the solutions would be postponing
the territorial conflict for at least ten years. A temporary
solution should be found - where the Albanians should accept
living within Serbia, but also where they would be able to enjoy
all human rights guaranteed by the world... Even though if it
comes to that point - that I think would be very difficult -
Serbs wouldn't be happy at all with the Albanians' return to the
Serbian state system, since such a thing would change the very
roots of the relation of forces within Serbia, because Albanians
would be there with one fourth of the potential votes. KOHA:
Today they wouldn't even accept the status of an equal republic
within some Yugoslav federation... TIJANIC: ...Well, on the other
side, I personally think that for a relatively long time, at
least for the twenty years to come, there won't be any Serb
leadership that would be willing to sign the agreement on
establishing the Republic of Kosova. That leadership would go
bankrupt immediately. KOHA: What's your opinion of the Serb
opposition? TIJANIC: It doesn't exist as a common denominator. It
is divided in the progovernment group, which consists of one big
party, maybe two; it is divided in the radical right, that is
known to negotiate with the regime - and, it is separated in a
centre block, that normally can't survive. To be more precise it
will never be united - not even when it comes to thwarting
Milosevic! Even though you're not going to like it, they might
share the same views only when it comes to refusing to grant
Kosova the status of a republic. So, put in other words, the only
point in which the Serbian government and opposition will agree,
is rejecting the status of a republic for Kosova, because it's
departure from the rest of Serbia, would mean national
castration. KOHA: How long could life be preserved by myths?
TIJANIC: I was born in Kosova and have special relations to the
place. But I have begun to get the impression that for Serbs,
Kosova is a heavenly place. It doesn't exist in a realistic form,
one can't grasp it. On the other hand, if it exists as a
realistic myth (!), if it is holy land, it would be predictable
that, after a number of attempts, tens of thousands of Serbs
would return. But there are only one thousand, five hundred or
sixty that would be willing to return. Which means that Serbs
don't like living in Kosova. Not even under the tough regime that
Serbia is known to offer. Even under the secure umbrella that
Serbia would offer, there wouldn't be ten thousand Serbs willing
to live there - let alone hundreds of thousands or a million.
KOHA: Would Serbs start war with Albanians for Kosova? TIJANIC:
Yes. KOHA: For a territory in which they wouldn't be willing to
live in? TIJANIC: At this present time, it's not a question of
ratio, reason - it is something completely irrational. Serbs came
out of war, after the destruction of Yugoslavia, with complexes
of the defeated. In other words, "from the war in which they
didn't even take part." The refugees, the disability to
attach Republika Srpska, the complete loss of Krajina,
Slavonia... All of this, is a form of an irrational dream, that's
why I think that Serbia would be willing to fight for Kosova in
Kosova. That would mean that they are not willing to give up a
territory no matter who lives in it. This is an issue of
symbolism, an issue on how it would look "on the world
map"... Of course, according to me, they have already lost
this territory, because they are not willing to live in it.
Regardless of many departures, the unreasonable politics, high
birth rate when it comes to Albanians... for what I consider to
be true. But, I also think that it is true that Serbs, within
their national state, wouldn't want to live there. That in itself
represents a problem. The actual situation is unbearable for both
sides. There is no real solution. I personally have started
thinking more and more about the option of splitting Kosova.
KOHA: You are thinking about Despic's presentation at the Serbian
Academy of Sciences and Arts? TIJANIC: Yes. He has been
repudiated by all Serbian politicians, but this is also a
realistic variant of a possible solution. KOHA: Don't you think,
among others, that such a thing is a deep disrespect of the
Dayton principles? TIJANIC: Yes, but according to Dayton's
criterions, there is no place even for establishing a republic of
Kosova. The Dayton agreement guarantees even Serbia's territorial
order. Dayton guaranteed the territorial integrity of all those
that participated in it... Some political circles in the USA
speculate that, in case Bosnia is destroyed, Serbia's unification
with Republika Srpska would be allowed, in which case, Serbia
would give Kosova up - in other words, it would give Kosova the
right to form a republic, that would be within a federation made
up of four units. Even though, such a thing would be very, very
difficult. KOHA: Do you think that the long lasting winter
protests in Serbia boosted it's political viewpoints, in the
aspect of understanding the needs and the pragmatic Serbian
inabilities, faced when with the mythic geo-political
differences? TIJANIC: They didn't make any changes in Serbia's
political map. That form of energy ran through the streets, was
washed up and in the end ceased to exist... KOHA: Except maybe,
the new capital city's mayor... TIJANIC: They're all senseless,
since they only prove that no political coalition, that doesn't
feel the same about political interests and aims, can't exist in
Serbia. I think that Djindjic and Draskovic lost a large amount
of political capital because of their conduct, and I also think
they one of them must sooner or later withdraw from the
coalition. The one that whilst withdrawing says "I don't
need to irritate Serbs or Belgrade with such conduct", will
immediately get a political lead. Anyway, I think that what makes
the street protests significant is that it put a new middle class
on the street to protest: students, dissatisfied state workers,
that can't make a living from their wages - so I think that
Milosevic, will have much trouble with them in the future, since
they are ready to protest in public whenever they think it fit.
On the other hand, the left wing owns 33 per cent of the votes,
the maximum that can be achieved. In the 33 per cent, I include
Milosevic's vote, since without him they would have only 20 per
cent of votes left. But, there is a chance of someone like
Djindjic or Kostunica, who might be able to merge (the scattered)
opposition. Even though I don't think that there is much the
opposition can do. I think it's clear that Milosevic and his
socialists will remain in power up to the turn of the century.
KOHA: Like a person who has worked for the media, what do you
think of the trials taking place in Kosova, and of people being
sentenced to ten years imprisonment for publishing a newspaper?
TIJANIC: I still think that there are written words that are
dangerous. Still, it's different if such a word brings
punishment. I'm not familiar with the trial, but I strongly
oppose any imprisonment of journalists, no matter whether they
are Albanians or Serbs. Even though, like I said before, there
are some things that, when written, can cause a real explosion,
especially in a place such as Kosova. On the other hand, I think
that Belgrade medias and other Serbian associations keep an eye
on the way that the events develop in Kosova, I might add, that
they are very objective too. Especially when it comes to those
that oppose war, on which I don't think Albanians should object.
KOHA: How would you evaluate Albright's visit? TIJANIC: Futile. I
think that her aim was to make Milosevic hear the American
administration's tone, but she didn't accomplish anything
politically. She met Milosevic in his uttermost aggressive mood,
after the 99 days' protests when his position strengthened. He
has put Vucelic and his people back in their ranks, and is
preparing for the elections which he will win, and he's also
going to get at least 1 billion dollars from the privatisation of
the post offices, he isn't interested in the foreign factor...
Milosevic speaks softly with the Americans only when the domestic
situation isn't good. He met Albright quietly, he didn't promise
anything, and walked her out - that was all. That was just a
simple visit that was not fruitful in a political or diplomatic
sense, for Americans or anybody else. In the end. I think that
all of ex-Yugoslav nations, other than Serbs and Albanians, have
settled their national issues. So it's only you and us left in
the battle. And, in a direct territorial conflict. Frankly, I
would prefer to see Kosova split, rather than having my son live
in a state with an Albanian majority within fifty years. Which
state would allow such a thing? If Kosova's question is not
solved, nationalism will explode up to an unforeseen level;
Seselj will grow at a very fast pace - even now he controls up to
20 % of the votes. But the radical solution of the problem
shouldn't be hastened. We shouldn't be nervous. I think we should
postpone it until the situation is calmer, since today, every
incident could lead to real fire. The solution should be
postponed at least ten years, during which time agreements about
living together should be reached, what Serbia should give up on
- within international guarantees - and consequently, what
Albanians should accept.
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