ZERI DIGEST

Nr.1713, October 30, 1999

• NATO’s MIGHT AND THE INCAPACITY OF THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL. By Blerim SHALA

• WHO SHOULD CLEAN THE GARBAGE? By Shkelzen MALIQI

• HAJREDIN KUQI, VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE PARTY FOR DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS OF KOSOVA: WE DO NOT COOPERATE WITH THOSE WHO OPPOSED THE WAR

• STUDENT’S UNION HAS NOT BEEN "INFECTED" BY POLITICS. By Rexhep DEMIRI

• IS UNMIK GOING TO ORGANIZE THE CENSUS IN KOSOVA, AND HOW? By Mehmet GJATA

• HOW MANY INHABITANTS DID KOSOVA HAVE IN 1981, 1991...

NATO’s MIGHT AND THE INCAPACITY OF THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL

By Blerim SHALA

Chief NATO politician, George Robertson, chief commander of the North-Atlantic Alliance, General Wesley Clark, chief prosecutor of the Hague Tribunal, Carla del Ponte, and chief of the UN Mission in Kosova, Bernard Kouchner - all have one denominator: Kosova. Success or failure in Kosova will largely affect the success or the failure of international bodies which these prominent personalities head. Success or failure in Kosova will be measured by the scale of the democratization of Kosova, by the degree of security and stability in Kosova, by the social and economic improvement and prosperity of Kosova, by the improvement in bringing before the Hague Tribunal chief war criminals, Slobodan Milosevic and his associates. A great obligation and effort, a difficult and a long-term effort for all of them, for all of us. As a long-term political, economic and security project of the West, Kosova nevertheless has its priorities. It’s main priority is related to the mandate of Carla del Ponte and the Hague Tribunal. The military might of the NATO Alliance, the political might of the United States, of the OUN and the European Union, may suffer in case of the incapacity of the Hague Tribunal. Therefore, the fate of the West in Kosova largely depends on whether those who administered the Kosovar tragedy are going to be sent to the Hague.

WHO SHOULD CLEAN THE GARBAGE?

By Shkelzen MALIQI

Kosovar’s idyll with foreigners seems to have taken a direction of first chilling and disappointments. Recently I was told by a person who held a senior post in the hierarchy of the protectorate, that "Kosovars only complain and accuse foreigners, without showing respect for what we have done for them. If they continue to do this, we will be forced to give up from Kosova!" Is a serious chilling of relations between foreigners and Kosovars, with the outcome that this senior UNMIK official announced - a disappointment which will force them to "give up from Kosova, indeed possible?!" I don’t believe so.

We consider that in the highest instances of relations, contentious reasons are of a political, and tactical and strategic, nature at the same time. They are linked to Kouchner’s failure, so far, to create a transitional council of Kosova, which would have functioned as a government with a mandate to make sensitive decisions, with long-term consequences. Kouchner’s problem is that he starts from a somewhat idealistic principle of regulating the situation in Kosova in agreement with representatives of local political forces. His formula somehow appears as a simple math of interests. In the Transitional Council, as its members, he recognizes the big threesome: Thaçi, Rugova and Qosja, on the Albanian part and a Serbian representative (most likely priest Artemije, father Sava or politician Trajkovic). Kouchner would have appointed beside them four influential representatives of the international community in the Transitional Council. As a crown to this project, would be himself, at the heading post of an arbiter, deciding on most sensitive issues.

The formula seems quite pragmatic, but essentially it is not. The realization of this idea would have eased the work of Kouchner himself, for he would have always had an alibi of regulating things in accordance with local forces in Kosova, on the behalf of Kosova. Kouchner has been, perhaps, encouraged by the fact that, in spite of big differences among them, Albanians’ representative trio has so far actively participated at meetings of the transitional council, it has acted and still acts as a consultative body. Why not transform this cooperation into a governmental body, which would have made important decisions related to the future of Kosova? But going for consultations and talks with Kouchner, who is assigned with the role of the head of the household in the post-war Kosova, is entirely different from their participation in a council which would have had responsibilities of a transitional government, where representation of Thaçi, Rugova and Qosja would have been of a coalition character.

From some well-informed sources we have learned that Albanian representatives in the transitional consultative council did not, in principle, refuse Kouchner’s plan, though they demanded certain additions, first of all in regard to the proportional representation, and a strict limitation of the Council’s mandate, in order to avoid the preponderance (which is seen as an insurmountable obstacle in a coalition where you have interests of nations represented), and how to make more transparent their effective non-participation in decisions of Kouchner’s administration which could, partly or largely, irritate the Kosovar public. Namely, Albanians have demanded a one more representative post in this council, which would almost equal that of Kouchner, such as his deputy, perhaps even with his responsibilities (that would be negotiable). With this addition, they would somewhat avoid possible preponderance in questions which they would consider harmful for the interest of the Albanians, assuming that Serbian representatives would not always share the views with foreigners, and that there would be someone among the foreigners who would support the reasonable demands of the Albanians. But, this for the Albanians would be more acceptable if their representative in the role of the deputy-head of the Council were to have the right of the veto.

Kouchner has not, of course, shown at all his enthusiasm for such a council with strict counting of representatives’ interests and vetoes. As if Kouchner fails to make a distinction between humanitarian intervention, which he has favored for a long time, and "humanitarian administration" of a country in which such an intervention was made (Kosova, in fact, is a world experiment in this regard). Otherwise, Kouchner, appears to nourish the illusion that even his administration could be "humanitarian", an administration of rational agreement of confronted interests. This approach is certainly not an approach of a politician and an administrator, but of a humanitarian worker who thinks that he has the "conflict resolution" formula, that the human rationale can and should prevail over disagreements which have caused large conflicts and tragedies. While, his mission and his administration cannot be of an agreeable, but rather intervening, in other words of a strict intervening character, which implies imposing certain unpopular measures for the majority, that is of a shock-therapy.

We should recall, and we have a confirmation by many everyday incidents and killings, that the environment in which Kouchner’s administration is acting is still an environment of war and conflicts. It is so in particular in certain segments of a final process of the creation of clear-cut borders between Serbs and Albanians, as in the increasing Serbian institutional violence in municipalities of Presheva, Bujanoc and Medvegja (thousands of Albanians are forced to leave for Kosova and in part, and temporarily, for Macedonia or European countries); latent and open conflicts in zones which Serbs want to proclaim their ethnic enclaves or cantons; the continuation of Serbs’ departure from isolated settlements in Kosova; the expulsion of Albanians who used to live in Belgrade and other places in Serbia; and the continuation of thousands of Albanians kept as hostages in Serbian prisons.

Until Kouchner’s administration or K-FOR are incapable of affecting these processes in which new ethnic borders are ultimately created, and until they have a clear plan for Mitrovica and for the demands of Serbs for cantonization and for the creation of parallel armies in Kosova, there is no real space for meaningful and more serious coalitions of the UNMIK with local forces. Kouchner ought to intervene, if he has the power, in these painful processes, which is making hundred thousands of people suffer. Only after he has shown his decisiveness and effectiveness in solving these problems, and in this he has to act as an intervening not humanitarian person, can a good environment for political solutions be created, where problems will no longer be attributed mainly to "stubborn Albanians", but would be addressed to all those who make obstructions of the mission, including here the complex structure of the mission, itself. While foreigners complain of the indigenous population, why don’t they, at least, undertake something in cleaning the garbage. If one seeks to see Albanians self-organize in the issue of garbage, why should this not go the same for other segments of every day life and political life?

HAJREDIN KUQI, VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE PARTY FOR DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS OF KOSOVA

WE DO NOT COOPERATE WITH THOSE WHO OPPOSED THE WAR

ZERI: During talks for the creation of the new party, it was spoken of other coalitions beside the United Democratic Party. Why were other coalitions, namely why was the coalition with the LBD, not made?

KUQI: Representatives of the Political Directorate of KLA have, indeed, held talks with those political parties and groups that had roughly the same stance during the liberation war in Kosova. There are no mysteries around talks in this regard, and these talks were held with representatives of the LBD, PPK, PBD and some other, and it is not the right time to mention details from those talks.

ZERI: Is it true that the primary criteria for a possible coalition with PPDK was the support or non-support of the war?

KUQI: The main criteria about a coalition with some political party or group was not to get together with those who not only did not support the war, but had , by their words and actions, opposed KLA’s and people’s heroic war. This means that all of those who in whatever form opposed the armed struggle for the liberation of Kosova, cannot be members of the PPDK, nor can they get into a coalition with us.

STUDENT’S UNION HAS NOT BEEN "INFECTED" BY POLITICS

By Rexhep DEMIRI

Student’s Union (SU) of the University of Prishtina (UP), with the well-known peaceful protests of October 1997, made a turn in the political life in Kosova. But, is the Union infected by the current political developments in Kosova? SU of the UP is not the co-founder of the PPDK, says Muhamet Mavraj. It is true that we have worked on the transformation of the KLA and in bringing close together Mr. Mahmuti’s party with KLA’s Political Directorate, and we feel good about that. But, always as figures of the students’ movement. Mentioning the SU of the UP in a statement publicized by PPDK was a flaw and we have, honestly, expected that those who made that statement would make a correction, since we as a students’ organization have no right to found a party. Talking about the party which we are mentioning, says Lajçi, I have among three political subjects represented the students’ movement, not the Independent Students’ Union. While putting together this statement, which was this party’s first public statement, we indeed had a flaw, but I repeat, it was not ISU, but as a students’ movement. I think that after some time, which we cannot define, students should raise their voice against the presence of the international factor, that is the reason we should preserve students’ independence. We don’t receive assistance by the international factor even in these moments for that assistance is conditioned , which in a way obliges you to accept the influence. In other words, if you accept the influence of the international factor, then the just voice, the revolutionary orientation will be lost, says Lajçi. I think that Union’s leaders were politicized from the very beginning, because their work was relying on political groups, they have expressed their individual views, says Xhevdet Zekaj, chairman of the ISU of the Faculty of Mathematics and Sciences,. Of course we as a students’ organization have no right to be involved in any political party, and as individuals everyone has that right, says Besnik Berisha, chairman of the ISU of the Faculty of Philology.

IS UNMIK GOING TO ORGANIZE THE CENSUS IN KOSOVA, AND HOW?

By Mehmet GJATA

The registration of the population did not start on October 1st, as the date defined by the UNMIK, and according to representatives of the UN Civil Administration which was established in Kosova, one gets an impression that this "enumeration" action is not going to begin yet. As a matter of fact it is going to begin only after necessary preparations for its realization are made. In other words, even the end of November, seen by the local media, though not by the UNMIK, as the most likely second term for the census in Kosova, is going to be only a repeated prediction for this extremely important action for Kosova.

Professionals and experts in this field see certain disputable things which come out from the announce information on the possible registration that will be organized by UNMIK, which ahead of time question the final success of this registration. First of all, the information does not make clear what kind of registration this is going to be, a partial or a specific one (only a registration of the electorate for the awaited elections), an extraordinary election or a general registration of the population, household and properties under a unique and all-embracing methodology.

If the UNMIK proclaims a general registration of the population, then the information in the media has some other flows. The 6 months period for the completion of the registration process, as foreseen by the UNMIK, is certainly strange to any standard of international practice regarding the registration of the population. For, according to the international experience, from the day it starts the registration lasts 10-15 days, and not 6 months. It is estimated that there are over 500 thousand Albanians who fled earlier to different countries in search for work, who fled due to the systematic persecution and repression of the Serbian regime, and finally a large number of war refugees, who have still not returned to their homes. These objections and suggestions of the Albanian professionals and experts in regard to the announced registration by UNMIK do not mean that Albanians are against the census.

On the contrary, more then any other people in the world and more than ever, Albanians are interested in having a genuine registration of the population, under criteria of the contemporary methodology and under provisions of the UN Section for Demography, which are unique international basis and criteria. There are 1.900 statistical points and around 4.500 registration points in Kosova. In each of the registration points you need one registrar, one in reserve and instructors. In other words, over 5 thousand people ought to be involved in the registration of the population in Kosova. In UNMIK now they say that the question of registration is a complex problem, and as such requires serious preparations. It is also very important for the stabilization of the situation in this environment. Therefore, the UNMIK personnel involved in the realization of this process is working tirelessly and with increased seriousness.

A date when the registration is due will be defined soon. UNMIK, UNHCR, OSCE and European Union will bear this action. Beside UNMIK employees, local staff and volunteers will be engaged in this process, as well. The registration is aimed to achieve these goals: so people could be provided personal documents; a list of possible voters for the awaited elections in Kosova would be created, the number of Kosova’s citizens would be established; and finally, necessary and very needed registers would be created which would serve to solve many problems in the field of health, civil matters and pensions.

HOW MANY INHABITANTS DID KOSOVA HAVE IN 1981, 1991...

Based on the 1981 census, in which Albanians participated, Kosova had 1.584.440 citizens: 1.226.736 Albanians, 209.498 Serbs, 27.028 Montenegrins.

Whereas in 1991, as it is made known the Albanian boycotted the census organized by the Serbian administration due to the Serbian occupation. Nevertheless, in the absence of the registration for Albanians, Serbs made only an approximation of the number of Albanians. Based on the approximations, there were 1.956.196 inhabitants in Kosova in 1991: 1.596.072 Albanians, 194.190 Serbs, 20.365 Montenegrins, etc.

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