ZERI DIGEST, No. 2 (June 19, 1999)

FACTS ON THE POLITICAL GROUND WILL DETERMINE THE ULTIMATE FATE OF KOSOVO

INTERVIEW: MORTON ABRAMOWITZ, THE PROMINENT AMERICAN DIPLOMAT. By Blerim SHALA

ZERI: Mr. Abramowitz, how do you value the latest developments on Kosova, now that the NATO Alliance has entered Kosova and when with the decision of the G-8, in other words major Western nations and Russia, as well as the UN Security Council, an international military and civilian protectorate in Kosova is being delineated?

ABRAMOWITZ: This a beginning of the peace creating process in Kosovo. However, at the beginning of this talk, I see it appropriate to underline that the Kosovar Albanian political elite should find force to recreate the same unity in the way it had achieved at the Rambuillet peaceful conference. Now we are all aware that this intrusion will have as a consequence the departure of all Serbian forces from Kosovo, the deployment of international peaceful troops lead by the NATO Alliance, which will enable the quick return of all deported Kosovars, I believe, by the end of the summer.

ZERI: The international presence in Kosova, as we know, had its political and its military aspect. What could you tell us about the international civil administration of Kosova?

ABRAMOWITZ: The civil aspect of the international protectorate will be very important. I think that favorable conditions are being created for a genuine political process in favor of the democratization of Kosovo, and toward opening a door for an end or an epilogue which Kosovar citizens wish for. Here, I have to add something. For me it is important, above all, how are things going to develop concretely on the ground. In this context, I think that Kosovar citizens should intensively work in creating democratic institutions in Kosovo.

ZERI: Is there a threat that the interim period could last more than anticipated at the Rambuillet Peaceful Conference, where this was supposed to be a third year period?

ABRAMOWITZ: It is true that that activation of the UN Security Council in the process of the resolution of the Kosovo question has quite complicated this process. However, as I previously said, it seems to me that new possibilities have now opened up for the creation of genuine democratic institutions in Kosovo, and that as far as the autochthonous population we will have political developments in Kosovo depending on the conduct and the actions of Albanian politicians of Kosovo.

ZERI: On one occasion you stated that you personally did not believe that you would come to see the arrival of the NATO Alliance in Kosova, and such a strong activation of the United States and the international community in the Kosova crisis. Now, how do you feel now once that all has been achieved and when NATO is in Kosova? And, do you think that we are really getting closer to the independence of Kosova?

ABRAMOWITZ: The suffering of the Albanian population of Kosovo in the recent years is well known. The suffering has multiplied this spring. Therefore, we indeed have a major breakthrough with security of the Kosovo people being an obligation of the NATO Alliance, when Kosovo‘s democratic structure is going to be an obligation of the European Union and of the OSCE. It is true that I personally did not believe that I would come to see the day when NATO goes into Kosovo. But, here we go, history can bring big surprises which sometimes are entirely positive.

On the other hand, it is true that FRY sovereignty over Kosovo is mentioned in the documents of the UN Security Council. But what the epilogue of this extremely complicated process is going to be this, first of all depends, on the facts on the ground, on the developments in Kosovo. We, also, should not exclude here eventual changes on the Serbian political scene, then the developments in Montenegro. How is Slobodan Milosevic going to act and what is he going to undertake in Serbia, how is he going to try to survive this crisis and again remain in power is, according to me, a very big question. I am also very curious how are things going to develop in the relation between Serbia and Montenegro.

ZERI: Will these processes lead toward the creation of new states in this part of Europe?

ABRAMOWITZ: Now, of course, the presence of the NATO Alliance will prevent these horrors from repeating, but in general, NATO by itself cannot determine the future of Kosovo and of the entire region. This future will not be a consequence of ratio of forces between Serbia and the others, which is not a small thing. But, at the last instance, this future will be a conclusion of the actions and positions of the regimes which will be created in Kosovo and elsewhere. Still, I know that the most difficult period in the life of Kosovars has passed and that you may expect days in which you could decide on your fate.

LIBERTY, (IN)DEPENDENCE

By Shkelzen MALIQI

Serbs are departing from Kosova very quickly. Not only the detested militaries, who were ordered to leave, are leaving. (Let them break their neck if possible!) Civilians, children, women and elderly are fleeing with them. They were given guarantees that they would be protected, but still they fear or they want to share the fate of defeat of the Serbian army which was comprised of their husbands or sons.

But with the arrival of the foreign troops something unexpected happened. While the Americans and the Europeans (British) were discussing (or more precisely - quarreling) who was to head the NATO troops, one Russian unit arrived first in Prishtina and then took a position at the Slatina airport. Even though a relatively small unit, and even though the incident was, in general, downgraded and minimized, the Russian demonstrative presence in Kosova as if threw in shadow the military and diplomatic triumph of the Western Alliance, and was once again was framing in broader lines the compromise on the interim status of Kosova. It‘s not the unified command over the peacekeeping contingent so enigmatic (NATO will not give up from the executive command, and this is what is opposed by Russians, they will consent with some previous transmission key of command) as much is problematic the Russian demand to have a territory of Kosova as a zone which they could oversee and that - as assumed in all analysis - everything could have ended with the partition of Kosova. Since Americans (in some semi-speculative statements that have not been publicized as much) did not decidedly oppose this possibility, on the contrary they have presented it as something that can be taken into consideration, I may think that Russians, after some negotiations, will be offered the possibility of controlling the Northern part of Kosova, concretely the Leposavic municipality which is inhabited almost exclusively by Serbs. This municipality was, anyhow, part of Serbia, but Rankovic, in 1957, decided to link it with Kosovo aiming, at that time, to at least in an extent, "improve" the unfavorable ethnic structure in Kosova, by a larger percentage of Serbs.

It is assumed that if Russians had their troops somewhere, this would be a less painful solution for Kosovars because they, actually, don‘t have vital interests in that part, as long as this would not imply encompassing wider zone of Northern Kosova, which would include Mitrovica.

But, since the stationing of the troops into zones, does not with automatism imply the partition, and since the protectorate is going to last at least five or more years, this problem is not something raised as an urgent matter, but something potential, which can be negotiated, or be a part of arbitration and bargaining, where neither would Albanians be damaged too much, nor would Serbs profit a lot.

But, let us go back to the current process. The victory of the NATO, regardless of Russia‘s dubious role, has excited Albanians, in particular those who remained in Kosova in the role of hostages. Those who had gone out earlier or were deported from Kosova, in spite of their natural joy, as if almost envy those who stayed as hostages, since they were not in Kosova to see the major breakthrough, the fleeing of the Serbian army, and the arrival of NATO. They feel like not taking part in the act of liberation.

And, indeed, L i b e r a t i o n is a big issue of these days of existence. Even the other force that played an important role in inciting the quicker resolution of the Kosova question, the KLA, appears on the scene with pretensions to present itself as a liberation force. KLA units are coming down into towns and temporarily taking control over deserted garrisons and Serbian military points. This way KLA wishes to establish itself as a force allied with the winners. NATO forces, for the time being, are tolerating the presence and the activity of the KLA, even though there are incidents caused by the misunderstanding of the NATO mission, as well as from various disorientations and approaches within KLA‘s row. Once again it is confirmed that KLA is not comprised of wholly unified formations, and that there are different streams within. Local commanders are not coordinated as they should with the general headquartersS

But, it is premature for an illusion to be created that what is happening now is total and authentic liberation of Kosova. We have to be realistic and see things as they are, with the framework that has been imposed by the Rambuillet Conference. There is space to discuss this very important issue, whether the position of Kosova is more advanced than it could have been in case Serbia were to accept the text of the Rambuillet agreement? There is no doubt that, of course, if we don‘t count the loss of lives and the big destruction, that Kosova has gained, and that Serbia has lost. But, we should not create an illusion that there is some essential advancement from the Rambuillet formulae. At least we should not have an illusion regarding the character of the intervention and of the temporary rule that is being installed in Kosova. We are going to be liberated from Serbia for as much as we are not going to have the Serbian gun pointed at us, but for some time we are going to live in a military environment and system. The international protectorate is a forceful military rule. We should not have illusions as far as NATO is concerned. It is an army that acts under the logic of clear cut orders and does not allow and does not discuss disputable issues, until this is ordered by the politiciansS The KLA is going to be convinced about this soon, tooS NATO‘s mandate is not only the expulsion of the Serbian military and the persecution of criminals, but also setting discipline among the Albanians and all other nations in Kosova, in order to create an environment of security, as a precondition for the creation of genuine democratic institutions.

The military and the political wing of the Albanian movement is currently struggling on who is going to come to power. It seems to me that this power will not be something as strong as it seems. It will, perhaps, resemble, more or less, the parallel rule that we know from O90ies, but short of elements of police repression and short of massive violations of human rights. Those who will have the local power could be cooperative with the protector, but could also be dissatisfied with the dictates of the generals, in particular with the limitations of aspirations in pretending to realize more than the framework of the protectorate allows.

In certain aspects the political standards of the Westerners, which they want to impose, are far from local standards. There may also be more severe conflicting situations, in particular in the aspect of the definition of the political and systems mandate of the protectorate. Some of our politicians, be those from the old squadron, or from KLA‘s avant-garde, still tend to create an illusion that everything has been completed, that the intervention of the NATO was done in order to pave, in an accelerated way, the road to Kosova‘s independence without any swerve. This is, simply, not true. NATO has not intervened to bring independence to Kosova, NATO was engaged in a humanitarian mission, against the genocide, in order to save the civilians and remove a rule that has for many years been the champion of violations of human rights and freedoms.

But, at the same time, NATO in Kosova, as in Bosnia, Macedonia and elsewhere in the region, found a possibility of continuing its shaken existence, through a long-term engagement in creating a zone of security in Balkans.

After the intervention of NATO, Kosova is, of course, more closer to independence, with a mere fact that there will be no effective opposition and defense of the Serbian troops. The occupation of Kosova is a history. The Serbian dictate of conditions for negotiations is a past. But, the Albanian factor should be aware that the independence is not something that will automatically be supported by all. Serbia and Yugoslavia, even though considerably weakened, still remain a factor who relations and the issue of sovereignty should be negotiated with. But, in the coming state, it is important that NATO will be a sovereign force, in other words the force that has the mandate of the UN Security Council to establish the protectorate over Kosova. This creates an entirely new, but certainly transitory, environment.

ONLY NATO CAN GUARANTEE PEACE IN BALKANS.

Abdurrahman HALITI, chairman of the PPD. By Bardh HAMZAJ

ZERI: Kosovars speak with admiration about the warm welcome of their brothers here?

HALITI: The preoccupation and the engagement of the Macedonian Albanians with Kosova has culminated this year, which was particularly expressed by the care of the domestic Albanians for the forcefully expelled from Kosova. Indeed, an unseen solidarity in these environments was shown, a solidarity which even the greatest optimists could not have foreseen. Around 150,000 deported from Kosova were settled with domestic families, which have not received nor do receive any assistance.

ZERI: In spite of the fact that around 300,000 forcefully expelled Albanians from Kosova found temporary shelter in Macedonia, there is an impression that the Macedonian government has tried in ever way not to host the deported. How do you explain this behavior of the Macedonian authorities?

HALITI: The Macedonian government has done only as much as it was obliged under international conventions to do for the Albanians expelled from Kosova. And this it did under the pressure exerted by the international factors, particularly by the NATO member countries.

The Macedonian government has not seen these people as mistreated and forcefully deported people, but only as Albanians. Macedonian government and a considerable part of the Macedonian population did not see the NATO military actions as an action against the aggressor who was conducting ethnic cleansing and genocide in the territory of Kosova, but as an action against Serbia and "Serb brothers", to whom they are linked by common origins, language and religious affiliation. Therefore, an enmity toward the deported was seen, that some have tried to explain with unsupported arguments, as that for the threat of changing of the ethnic structure and the eventual remaining of the expelled here.

ZERI: What does the existence of these dispositions for the future of Macedonia?

HALITI: The existence of Macedonia is directly linked to its pro-Western orientation, to its membership in the European structures and the North-Atlantic Alliance. Those who have Macedonian a national feeling and who want an independent Macedonia, are aware or at least should be aware of this. There are politically organized structures in Macedonia which do not see the future of Macedonia as an independent state, but in different ties with some of the neighbors. I think that Kosova and other Balkans countries have a safe future prospect only integrated in the European Union and NATO.

ZERI: There was an incident in Tetova, few days ago. Young Macedonians attacked their Albanian counterparts, who were cheering the NATO and the KLA. Was this an incident of momentary mood, or something that can announce difficult times days for Macedonia?

HALITI: The different mood toward NATO is evident. Albanians wholly support NATO, they cheer the soldiers wherever they meet them, while Macedonians try to provoke them in every way, even to insult them. The Tetova incident is a consequence of these moods, but I don‘t think that we should draw conclusions that this disposition is gong to last, but it is rather something of a character that goes on and off. I am convinced that we should be maximally cautious because the destabilization of Macedonia, and Albania, too was official Yugoslavia‘s intention and goal in order to "argument" the Serbian thesis that war is inevitable, which would have brought even bigger tragedy, in particular for the Albanians.

ZERI: Do you think that this threat has been finally avoided?

HALITI: I think that Macedonia, Albania and Kosova are finally under a protective umbrella of a force, which I think everyone wanted, and which will be sufficient so no one from side could incite processes that would be against the interests of Albanians, Macedonians and the others.

THE INDEPENDENCE AS A NATURAL END OF THE INTERIM PERIOD

By Blerim SHALA

The process of the resolution of the Kosova question, as we can see now, will go through two stages. In the immediate or short-term and in the long-term stage.

The first, immediate, stage of the resolution of the Kosova question implies, as it is clearly defined in the five point plan of the NATO Alliance that was revealed before the international public short time after the beginning of the NATO air strikes, the full withdrawal of all Serbian police, military and paramilitary forces from Kosova, then the deployment of the international peacekeeping forces, under the command of the NATO Alliance, and the return of over one million deported Kosovars, sheltered in Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and elsewhere in the West. This stage, as it is known, is now on the verge of being realized and the Western military presence will guarantee the reestablishment of the ethnic structure of Kosova, whose altering was the primary aim of Slobodan Milosevic‘s Serbian regime. The incident from last week with Russian units has shown the existence of "judicial holes", as they say, or even the surplus of "positive ambiguities" in these documents. Article 19 of the UN Security Council Resolution, adopted last week, proves that the international civilian and military presence is seen as a long-lasting presence, since the follow up of this presence, initially set for twelve months, on the part of the UN Security Council is automatic, unless this body decides differently. Given the way the UN Security Council functions, that a consensus or full agreement between full permanent member states off this superior decision making body of the international security needs to be reached, then we can already predict that the international civilian and military presence in Kosova will be long-lasting presence. Then, article on the military and technical Agreement between the NATO Alliance and representatives of the Serbian forces, signed last week, in a military base in Kumanova, proves that the supreme commander of the peacekeeping forces in Kosova, General Michael Jackson, has full competencies as far as the military aspect of the Agreement on Kosova. So, the first stage of the resolution of the Kosova question, as can be seen, based on the two documents mentioned earlier, has a chance to pass without any big turmoil. The presence of over 50,000 troops of the NATO Alliance, in a territory not over 11,000 square kilometers, will inevitably derive peace and security, which is and will be the foundation on which the interim state would be built, which in the form of the creation of democratic institutions and structures in Kosova should be guaranteed by the OSCE, the European Union and other relevant international mechanisms. It is true that the Article 11 of the UN resolution defines that the international civilian administration, among others, is obliged to foster the final resolution of the Kosova question, wholly taking into consideration the Ahtisari-Chernomyrdin Agreement and the Rambuillet Agreement, still, one can see the procedure for reaching the final status left aside intentionally. This has served as a source of a rational political fear of the Albanians who, with a reason, have asked questions regarding the evasion of the final position of the Rambuillet Document in current documents on Kosova. The evasion of the final position of Rambuillet is seen as a trap that could strangle the finale which the Kosova citizens wished, in other words, the referendum, whose outcome would have been the fundament of the long-term status of Kosova. In spite of the fact that this fear is rational, it seems that doors for a referendum have remained open, and that the framework of the civilian and military administration of Kosova may serve well the process of the building of the mechanism for the final status of Kosova. Therefore, the Kosovar finale will be an outcome not only of the political process envisioned in paper and documents, but of the capability of giving a direction that was wished to that process. Kosova has a real chance to have a state formed status at the end of that interim period.

DAYS WHEN EPOCHS ARE CHANGING

Ekrem Krasniqi, Prishtina

On the border with caravan, Macedonians were controlling the exits from their country. Some yards away, on the left side of the road, three Serb police officers from special units. They were only watching. They had nothing to do at the place where they, for many, many years, collected money. Further on, we breathed more easily. The first check-point was that of the K-For. British were stopping and controlling the accreditation of the journalists. In this check-point you could hear "Please, your accreditation. Thank you, have a nice journey". British troops, almost in every two kilometers. They did not seem exhausted from the heat. These were first days of their, perhaps, many year mission. We were thinking that we would come across Serbian troops on each turn. We were wrong until entering to Prishtina.

From the hill from where you could see the entire Prishtina, one truck had mistaken the road and was going on the opposite direction from us. There were very few, almost no, citizens on the streets. It was still early for the citizens of the capital to go out freely on their streets banned for them for one year now. We headed toward the Hotel Grand. In the hotel you could see more people. Across the hotel, you could not count the cars. Neither people. That day, June 14, you could hear languages from all around the world. "It seems that something is happening here", said my colleague from the Hungarian TV. Serbian language is also a foreign language, and it was also dominating. Around 15:30 I saw some seven-eight young Prishtina citizens who were speaking Albanian. They were looking or had found work as interpreters for foreign journalists, whose number was enormous. In the hotel lobby many journalists who had covered NATO in Brussels for 77 days. Bored from press conferences, more than two during the days, organized from the NATO officials in Brussels, they arrived to see the things on the ground. Most of the ones I knew were surprised how a journalist who during the time that ZERI had ceased its publication had worked for Kosovapress all along, could dare come into a hotel full of Serbs, where Serb gun shots lighted the skies of Prishtina. Nothing happens. A colleague from Belgium says that since early morning, when the British troops killed a Serbian police officers, Serbs have started to calm. Now they are pacified. Some Belgian reporters talk about how a day before they were in the village of Recak. They had a Serbian interpreter, around 50 years old, from Belgrade, who was saying that they were stopped at the KLA check-point entering the village.

Later we went to Dragodan. In the upper left side of Dragodan we met Mr. David Slin, former first secretary in the British Embassy, in Belgrade, now the first man for the Kosova question, in the cabinet of British Foreign Minister, Robin Cook. He was checking on his former apartment. It was broken into, pillaged. All the houses we got close to look at, on the left side of Dragodan were broken into and pillaged. They were empty. Doors, broken glassS Everything broken and pillaged. Empty houses. Not a single human voice. We tried to drive into three or four streets. Impossible. On the first street, destroyed walls of a house had blocked the road. On the other, it was impossible to go through. Roads were blocked by stones and various things. It appeared that someone had tried to barricade the streets. We went back. Lower down, on the left side, across the bridge, which links to the downtown Prishtina, we meet an Albanian. Facing his house, two houses owned by Serbs were also broken into, destroyed, pillaged. The only resident of Dragodan, tell us that these two houses were owned by Serbs. They had left Prishtina some time ago. They had left behind the sign: "Don‘t touch, Serbian house". In vain.

Three British tanks arrived and headed to where we previously were. We followed them in a car. They stopped and were prepared to shoot. After a while we came out of the car, together with the Hungarian cameraman and photographer. British soldiers were talking to Serbian soldiers. British wanted to go through the Serbian military check-point so they could visit the upper part of Dragodan. Only one British tank crossed the check-point. Serbian soldiers had changed the attitude they had in the beginning. We returned to Hotel Grand. Journalists had stacked the hotel restaurants and were having dinner. Five Serb soldiers were also there. Many Serb civilians, too. Everyone was having a rest.

Foreign reporters were having fun before going, the next day, every single one of them, after their newspaper story from the current medial center of the world. The next day, two reporters of the two Belgian TV channels were to go to Recak. The drivers were Albanian. Visar and his friend had agreed to drive fast when they go through Gracanica. Two young Prishtina citizens were afraid of having to go through Gracanica. In Gracanica, on the right side of the road, in a terrace of a house, you could see Serbian soldiers, staying in a private house. They were passing their time awaiting the moment when they would leave Kosova. In the middle of Gracanica, at the British check-point, many British troops. We passed Gracanica, Lipjan, Shtime and we arrived to Recak, not a single sign of Serbian military or police. Between Shtimje and village of Recak we stopped at the KLA check-point. We showed our accreditation. We asked to interview them. We were refused since we were supposed to have been allowed for that from the Zone command. We were informed that the KLA General headquarters was stopping their soldiers to give interviews. Soldiers off the Shtimje zone were getting their orders from above. We arrived in Recak; we could see some villagers, it seemed that they were just returning to their houses. The majority of the residents of the village, where the Serbian police had massacred 40 villagers, on January 15, now were deported mainly to FYROM, and some of them to Albania. A number of them, since the massacre, had spent last months, sometimes in the mountains and sometimes in different villages of the Rahovec, Ferizaj and Shtimje municipalities. Since the day before, the displaced villagers had begun returning to these parts, returning to their homes. KLA soldiers were present in the village, and they were in charge of securing the village and villagers, who were returning, although always in small numbers. They also didn‘t want to talk. Until last Tuesday there were around 100 villagers of Recak who had begun reorganizing their lives after Serbian forces had pulled out some three days earlier from their positions in the village and vicinity.

All the houses we visited were deserted, demolished and pillaged.

THE END OF THE SERB RULE IN KOSOVA

Isuf HAJRIZI, Washington D.C.

A lot of people were surprised how Milosevic agreed "so quickly" to giving away Kosova. Serb rule in Kosova is embodied so deep in the minds of the people that very few believed that Serbia would have turned its back to its "cradle". But, the continuous bombardment of the NATO planes, after 72 days, had kneeled down the Serb forces, which had never confronted a real military power until this year. Americans were convinced that if Milosevic would not have given up for at least one month, NATO was capable of cleansing Kosova from even the last Serbian soldier and policeman. That is why Milosevic decided on an agreement.

This time NATO insists that all Serb forces withdraw from Kosova in order to put an end to the Serbian rule in Kosova. This is the point where Albanians should find their biggest condolence. In Rambuillet it was anticipated that 2,500 policemen and 2,700 soldiers remain within Kosova at least for a year. In the Rambuillet agreement only 28,000 NATO troops were supposed to be deployed in Kosova at the time when Milosevic categorically said that "not a single foreign soldier is going to walk in Kosova". Now they will deploy 50,000.

In Rambuillet, Serbia was to be allowed to have the bodies of judicial administration in Kosova; there are no signs of that in the latest agreement. When they return to Kosova, according to a Western diplomat, Albanian expellees don‘t have to ask Serbian bodies for the documentation that Serbs themselves have destroyed.

In Rambuillet the border was to be controlled by Serb forces; in the latest agreement, if the word of the U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, means something, "there is absolutely no discussion about Serbs watching the border", the borders will be controlled by NATO troops. According to Albright some Serb police officer may be allowed near the border in the observing but not implementing role.

The Rambuillet document was defined for the political future of Kosova, where Albanians were still to remain under Serbia and under Yugoslavia. The question of the referendum on independence was clarified well, and there was space for manipulation "by the stronger side". Not a single word is said on the status of Kosova, which is now entirely under the international protectorate, in the last document. While it is thought that this is in favor of Serbia, analysts have commented the very same point as positive for the Albanians, who de facto, with the deployment of the international forces in their homeland, have won the victory and independence, at least, from Serbia.

There was a fear that Kosova, in the last document, could be divided between NATO and Russian forces, In reality, American officials are more than convinced that this will not happen and that Russian forces will be put under the command of NATO with some "explanation" that they will, allegedly, report to some commander from a neutral country (perhaps Finland), which in retrospective, is controlled by NATO.

"YUGOSLAVIA" HAS FOREVER LOST ITS SOVEREIGNTY OVER KOSOVA .

Jens REUTER, expert on Balkan issues. By Agim ZOGAJ

ZERI: NATO has already been spread throughout Kosova, while Serbian occupation troops are retreating. Does this ultimately imply new opportunities for the resolution of the Kosova problem?

REUTER: It is very understandable that with the arrival of NATO in Kosova a new reality is being created not only in Kosova and for Kosova, but in the geo-strategic plan in Balkans and wider. So, with the peaceful plan on Kosova, and not only with the arrival of NATO and withdrawal of Serbian forces, Yugoslavia, respectively Serbia, is definitely losing the sovereignty over Kosova. On the other hand the protectorate, which has now started, will last five or more years and without any dilemma, Serbia will never be able again to return Kosova under its rule. Western diplomats dare not talk about the future of Kosova, but I personally cannot see nor imagine the future of Kosova within Yugoslavia, nor Serbia.

ZERI: How could the international administration of Kosova look like?

REUTER: Initially, that is for a certain period of time, the internal international administration in Kosova will look as a military administration under the NATO or UN command. Those Albanians who say that the presence of NATO forces, in other words the protectorate, will be a long-term presence, are right. I think that the KLA leaders have to be inevitably involved in all forms of the civilian administration.

ZERI: Can the intervention of the Russsian troops in Kosova have an implication on future developments.

REUTER: The incursion, without an agreement, of the Russian troops in Kosova is not incidental nor without a reason. I think that the aim of Russians in alliance and in a secret agreement with Belgrade and directly with Milosevic, is to create a zone of control in the northern part of Kosova and eventually create conditions for the partition of Kosova. Under the Russian-Serbian variant, Serbia would be given a smaller part of Northern Kosova, while the bulk of it would remain to the Albanians. But there is no discussion about the partition of Kosova, and the Russian-Serbian plan cannot be realized, since, first of all, the United States are decidedly against partition.

ZERI: In this context, what is the position of the German diplomacy?

REUTER: The German diplomacy is also decisive regarding this matter stating it is against partition. Indeed, there are some politicians in the opposition with different views, but they don‘t count so much. Concretely, you may have read that opposition politician Karl Lamer has expressed in favor of the partition of Kosova. However, I expect very soon to see the foreign minister, Mr. Fischer, declare himself on this matter, and he has talked against the partition for many times.

ZERI: What developments can we anticipate in Serbia.

REUTER: I would say that I don‘t expect any change in the system of the dictatorial rule in Serbia. Milosevic with his police and with his people in the system is still strong, while there is no opposition in Serbia. Draskovic, practically, does not act any more, he does not represent anything for the current Serbian politics, whereas Djindjic is exhausted, spent and uninventive. Serbian people can be expected to suffer longer not only for bread and medicine?!

ZERI: What kind of perspective can the Kosova people expect in the context of recent developments in Balkans and wider?

REUTER: Kosovar Albanians and their new leadership should be very clever and clear in presenting their demands and aspirations. Albanians should be prudent and prove by facts that at this moment, at this stage of new history, they have no other aggressive goals.

ZERI: What aggressive goals are you referring to?

REUTER: One of the aggressive goals is if Albanians aim the destruction of Macedonia. I myself advocate the view that Kosovar Albanians rightly and in a legitimate way struggle for independence.

go to top

P.O. Box, CH-8031 Zürich, Switzerland
Phone +41-1-272 46 37,  Fax +41-1-272 46 82, email: info@MEDIENHILFE.ch