THE MEDIA AT A TURNING POINT:

A MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Zoran Udovicic, Tarik Jusic, Mehmed Halilovic, Radenko Udovicic and Media Plan Institute Research Team[1]

INTRODUCTION

This paper has two main goals: first, to provide systematic and comprehensive information on the structural, political and socio-economic conditions in which media outlets in today’s Bosnia-Herzegovina operate, and second, to provide a detailed analysis of the legal framework defining the work of the media in this country. In our research of the overall media situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its legal framework, we used the following issues, which at the same time, defined the structure of the paper, as our guidelines:

• What is the general socio-economic and political framework that media outlets operate in, and in what way does the given situation determine their functioning?

• What are the basic structural characteristics of the media in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

• What are the legal determinants of media functioning in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

• What are the key issues of legal regulation of the media in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

The Bosnian-Herzegovinian media arena is extremely complex. It reflects the socio-economic and political situation in the country in every regard – there is no media market, professionalism is at a low level, there is political and economic dependence on political parties, ruling structures or donors, there is ethnic partition and exclusion, as well as exposure to various forms of pressure and obstruction. However, on the other hand, the media in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been undergoing a very troubled period of change over the past five years. We are witnesses to many parallel processes that have a crucial effect on the media: creation of regulatory institutions, passing of laws in the media field, restructuring of the public broadcasters, efforts aimed at building a public broadcasting system for the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and development of commercial broadcasting networks in the entire territory of the country.

In order to make a detailed analysis of the present situation in such a complex media arena, we will first give a general overview of the socio-economic and political frameworks in which the media in Bosnia-Herzegovina operate. By the very nature of such an analysis, all three of these aspects (social, political and economic) will interweave. After making a contextual analysis of the media arena in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we will deal with its structural characteristics. This will paint a comprehensive picture of the media in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a foundation for further analysis of the legal aspects of the media arena in the final part of the paper.

 1.  THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE MEDIA ARENA IN BOSNIA- HERZEGOVINA

The ethnic structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina is highly complex and considerably polarized: none of the three main ethnic groups – Bosniaks,[2] Serbs and Croats – are in absolute majority. According to the 1991 census of the population, Bosnia-Herzegovina had a population of 4.35 million: Bosniaks made up 44 percent of the population, Serbs 31 percent, and Croats 17 percent. The remaining citizens declared themselves as Yugoslavs (5 percent) or members of 25 other nationalities (3 percent). The first free elections in November of 1990 brought to power forces with strong nationalist zeal from all three ethnic groups. The Bosniak party SDA (Party of Democratic Action) won the largest number of votes (33 percent). The Serb party SDS (Serb Democratic Party) came in second with 26 percent of the vote, and the Croat party HDZ BiH (Croat Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina) was in third place with 16 percent. These three parties formed a coalition government and their members filled the rotating collective State Presidency, but their irreconcilable interests ultimately led to war, which broke out in early 1992.

The war drastically changed the socio-economic and political situation. By 1996, approximately 200,000 people were killed, around one million people were displaced throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, and another one million were scattered across the globe. Despite the establishment of peace at the end of 1995, refugees and displaced persons have been slow to return to their former places of residence: some have started over abroad or in new communities, others have had their property destroyed, or they cannot find work. Political obstacles and a high level of inter-ethnic distrust still exist.

It is estimated that economic damage and loss has reached between 70 and 150 billion US dollars. At the beginning of 1996 industrial production was reduced to only five percent of the 1991 level of production, with an unemployment rate reaching 75 percent in some parts of the country (Media Plan, 1997a: 41). The situation in the year 2000 remains unfavorable. According to Central Bank BiH data,[3] the average net salary in August 2000 in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina amounted to 418 KM[4], and 286 KM in the Republika Srpska. The unemployment rate in the Federation was 39.4 percent, and in the Republika Srpska 41.1 percent. According to data published by the “Financial Times,”3 Bosnia-Herzegovina’s trade balance in 2000 was 1.5 billion dollars, while gross national product was 4.4 billion dollars. These figures speak clearly about the difficult economic position that Bosnia-Herzegovina is in today.

New political and institutional arrangements were created by the Dayton Peace Agreement,4 which provided continuity of the sovereign state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The state now consists of two entities: Republika Srpska (majority Serb populated), which covers 49 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s total territory, and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (majority Bosniak and Croat populated) with 51 percent of territory. The common state institutions and responsibilities of Bosnia-Herzegovina are reduced to several basic functions such as international policy, monetary policy, international trade, and customs policy. The entities are responsible for their own individual armies, police forces and other functions, which are not part of the jurisdiction of the common state institutions. Such a loose, and at the same time complex structure is imminently inclined to inefficiency, and leaves enough maneuvering room for centrifugal political options and tendencies. The ultimate result of such arrangements is an extremely unstable political arena, with a fragmented political party system and strong influence of extreme right-wing, anti-system nationalistic options.

Despite progress in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement (neutralization of military forces, freedom of movement, initial results in the return of refugees), overall social and economic development in Bosnia-Herzegovina is unfolding slowly and is faced with many obstructions. Serious resistance still comes from the still dominant political parties with more or less pronounced nationalistic programs – SDS, HDZ and SDA. None of them are truly pleased with the new arrangements. Both the Serb and Croat political leaderships would like a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the Bosniak leadership prefers a strong centralized state. This has led to the development of parallel bodies and mechanism of power, which are still functioning outside the institutional framework. Lack of transparency of public organizations and non-functioning or limited functioning of the rule of law in many of aspects considerably contribute to this.

We can say that today’s Bosnia-Herzegovina is going through a very specific and highly complicated period, undergoing at the same time a process of post-communist transition and a process of post-war inter-ethnic reconciliation. These two parallel processes that characterize today’s Bosnia-Herzegovina are the two main axles along which the power struggle in this country is unfolding:

•  The process of post-communist transition towards democracy inevitably leads to elimination of authoritarian mechanisms of power, as well as elimination of the authoritarian leadership, which bases its rule on it. This all ultimately leads to a strong struggle for redistribution of social power, which has been concentrated over the past 10 years in the hands of a very narrow circle of people and distributed along national, i.e. ethnic lines.

• The second axle of the power struggle is the very process of reconciliation among the ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina – the ruling leaderships are trying to maintain inter-ethnic division and to further homogenize their own ethnic groups, which become an inexhaustible source of power. In this context, there is an ever-present struggle between ethnocratic leaderships, which impede reconciliation processes (inter-ethnic cooperation, return of refugees) on one hand, and various international factors and opposition political parties which, on the other hand, are struggling for a multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina (also see ESI, 1999).

In this context, the Dayton Agreement was created in such a way that it gives international factors5 all necessary rights to react to any difficulties that may arise during their mandate in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United States insisted on a strong military implementation force, which would be superior to the three national armies present on the ground at the end of 1995. In addition, the agreement contains elements that enable full inclusion of international factors in all key peace implementation processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, from creating common Bosnian institutions to developing civil society. The international factors were given almost unlimited powers to prevent any obstruction of implementation of the peace plan, including the field of mass media.

It is important to emphasize that the political system itself in Bosnia-Herzegovina is undergoing rapid change. Political parties have been expanding by grouping into blocs, slowly shaping the future look of the partisan system in the country. This is a very important process. Once absolute, the political monopoly of the national parties has now in both entities slowly been getting competition in the multitude of other political parties. These new parties have shown an interest in entering into coalitions and alliances and gathering around stronger opposition centers. Several important political groups have been profiled, which now have a leading role in the political process. The power struggle in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is mainly taking place between national parties and the social-democrats, because development of authentic civil parties of the center has been slowed down by the war. The most important change is certainly the strengthening of the Social-Democratic Party BiH (SDP), which won the April 2000 Municipal Elections in almost all important municipalities in the Federation, and together with the SDA and SBiH (Party for BiH) took top position on the political ladder in the November 2000 General Elections. The strengthening of the SDP is toppling down the SDA aura that this party represents all Bosniak interests.

The Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) had started losing its monopolistic position among Croats two years ago, but this trend was halted by the November 2000 elections. The recent democratic changes in Croatia had been expected to favor the dissolution of the hard-line Croat political establishment in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but this did not happen due to the still widespread inter-ethnic distrust in BiH, which rightwing parties have abundantly been helping. The process of political stratification in the Republika Srpska had started in 1997 under strong pressure of the international community. However, new political parties, formed mainly by dissidents from the ruling SDS, halted democratic changes in this entity half-way; newly-formed parties have not become strong enough, and therefore the political option of the once ruling Serb Democratic Party has again stepped in the picture.

This all shows that the process of dwindling of nationalistic parties, which were organized as national movements, has been slow to unfold. We can say that the overall social environment is under the strong influence of centrifugal rightwing forces, due to which development of a modern and democratic media system has not been very stimulated.

2.   THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEDIA ARENA IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

This part of the paper deals with the basic structural characteristics of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian media arena. It provides a foundation for a further detailed analysis of media legislation.

2.1.  Three Media Arenas in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The recent war (1992-1995) interrupted development and almost destroyed the media infrastructure. The ownership transformation process was suspended, and many newspapers and broadcasters became instruments of propaganda for the authorities and other centers of power, which were being constituted in the dismembered Bosnia-Herzegovina. Broadcasters from Belgrade and Zagreb competed in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s territory for the interests of their states. Three broadcasting systems, separate in the technical, programming and even legal regard, appeared in territories controlled by the armies and ruling political parties of the three peoples (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs)6. This division has left its mark on today’s organization of the broadcasting systems in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially because the Dayton Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina gave powers in the field of media and information to the entities and thus formally prevented the central state bodies from passing any laws in the media field, which was interpreted as an impossibility for the existence of a single state (public) broadcaster. The international community later gave a more flexible interpretation of the spirit of the Dayton Constitution, but the incomplete, compromised and illogical media solutions created in Dayton for a long time impeded integral media development in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A self-contained media system is functioning in the Republika Srpska, consisting of Radio Television Republika Srpska (founded by the Assembly, but influenced by the Government), a network of local broadcasters owned by municipalities and influenced by local authorities, and a large number of private (independent and alternative) broadcasters and newspapers, whose establishment was helped by the international community. Among them are the most eminent daily “Nezavisne novine,” the magazine “Reporter,” and Alternativna TV Banja Luka. During two post-war years, programs broadcast by the state RTV Republika Srpska, based in Pale near Sarajevo, the biggest stronghold of nationalism, abounded in inflammatory language and anti-Dayton propaganda. Government- and political party-run newspapers and a large number of local broadcasters in the Republika Srpska behaved in a similar way. The international community was finally compelled to intervene at the end of 1997: based on the mandate entrusted upon the High Representative to Bosnia-Herzegovina, SFOR soldiers seized the transmitters used by this broadcaster, after which its seat was moved to a politically more cooperative part of the Republika Srpska – Banja Luka. Since then, RTRS has been broadcasting under the watchful eye of the international community, and TV programs from Belgrade have been excluded. RTRS is now being restructured into a public broadcasting system (see Part 3).

Political changes towards democratization, which started in the Republika Srpska in 1997, affected the creation of a more democratic media environment in this entity. However, state-run media outlets, in accordance with general political consensus in the Republika Srpska, are still reserved towards the establishment of a single, open media system in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the wartime division into a “Bosniak” and a “Croat” sphere is still present. Two unconnected broadcasting systems operated until 1999 – RTV BiH in Sarajevo, controlled by Bosniak authorities, and a system of local broadcasters in Mostar, controlled by the ruling Croat political party HDZ. Radio Television BiH, although the legal successor to the pre-war RTV Sarajevo which once covered all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was reduced so much during the war in terms of equipment, programming and staffing, that it practically became a mouthpiece for the ruling Bosniak party. Although it has come out of the party’s embrace, RTV BiH has never become a medium of all citizens and nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In the so-called Croat part of the Federation, the broadcasters were an extended arm of HRTV Zagreb (Croatian Radio Television Zagreb) and the Croatian regime. The ruling Croatian party’s media strategy was that the informative needs of the Croat population in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be satisfied by media outlets from Zagreb. Nationalism and political pressure exerted by the HDZ impeded the establishment of a large number of independent media outlets in Croat-majority populated areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Taking into account that state broadcasters continue to have biggest influence, the international community’s High Representative to Bosnia-Herzegovina used his powers and in July of 1999 imposed a decision to restructure the state radio and television into a public service. Although the decision came with a delay and was slammed by local political structures, it was a radical step towards breaking down communication barriers and building an open media scene in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In the so-called Bosniak part of the Federation, a small independent media scene existed during the war in larger cities such as Sarajevo, Zenica and Tuzla, which the international community has continued to help wholeheartedly in peace. The papers “Oslobodjenje” and “Vecernje novine” and the magazines “Dani” and “Slobodna Bosna” today remain important bearers of free journalism. In the Federation, which consists of 10 cantons, three cantonal broadcasters were founded – in Sarajevo, Tuzla and Bihac. Each of these stations relies on the ruling local political center. However, RTV BiH still has biggest influence. By a decision of the High Representative, RTV BiH started a restructuring process aimed at transforming it into two broadcasters – a public broadcasting service for the whole country and RTV Federation BiH. At the same time when the High Representative took his decision, the Independent Media Commission (IMC – regulatory agency for broadcasters in Bosnia-Herzegovina) banned the work of the Croat TV station EROTEL based in Mostar which was not legally registered, which created conditions for establishing a single public broadcasting system for the whole Federation. The ruling Bosnian Croat party reluctantly accepted the concept of a federal radio and television broadcaster, but has recently again been requesting the establishment of a public broadcaster exclusively for Croats.

A number of independent and alternative media outlets from both entities tried by themselves to break through the barriers imposed by politicians (“Slobodna Bosna,” “Dani,” “Front Slobode,” “Nezavisne novine). They started exchanging articles and programs. Pioneer efforts in press distribution across entity lines were made by Media Plan and Soros Media Center from Sarajevo with support from the OSCE. Today, there are practically no physical or political obstacles to press distribution throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the ethnically divided public has already grown accustomed to buying and reading only “their own” press. The Sarajevo-based “Vecernje novine” published in 1997 an edition for the Republika Srpska, but failed in its market. A new attempt in October 2000 was made by the Banja Luka-based “Nezavisne novine,” which published a single edition for the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, division of the market is favored by the lack of modern and strong distribution companies.

In such circumstances, the media arena in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the post-war period continues to reflect the ethnic, territorial and political division of the country. This results in that the media are still under the pressure of the ruling leaderships, which maintain their monopolies by using all available means, including threats, blackmail, financial dependence, and even physical force against disobedient media outlets (see Human Rights World Report 1998: International Crisis Group, 1997; Irex ProMedia Report 2000).

In conditions of repression and lack of market-driven economy, weak and dispersed opposition, ethnically homogenous and mutually distrustful public, and internal resistance inside public broadcasters, influential media outlets simply lack the potential to stimulate crucial changes in the dominant discourse. Small independent media outlets are too weak to bring about considerable change, and due to their independence, they are held back by the character of their public. As the public in Bosnia-Herzegovina is ethnically structured, independent media outlets are compelled to ethnically profile their content if they want to keep or attract the public. In such unfavorable circumstances, few small media organizations can afford to have a universal, supraethnic character of content. Due to all this, although these independent media outlets criticize the ruling structures, they continue to considerably appeal to ethnic sentiment and hence additionally affirm the existing divisions.

2.2.  The Fluid Media Arena in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Media Development from 1991 to 2000

In 1991 there were 435 media outlets registered in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 377 newspapers and other print media, 54 radio stations, four TV stations and RTSA – a public state broadcasting enterprise with two TV and three radio channels. Due to drastic changes in the socio-economic and political situation during the war, only 50 percent of the media, or more precisely 272 active media outlets, survived the war. Of that number, 203 media outlets were based in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 69 in the Republika Srpska. A drastic decline occurred in the field of the press because printing capacities were destroyed, distribution channels were cut, and political and military propaganda was more interested in broadcasters (Media Plan 1997a: 67).

In the year 2000, there are 210 radio and 71 TV stations which broadcast program, and it is estimated that there are around 130 print media (IMC and MPI, August 2000).

• Radio and Television:

As a result of big investments by the international community, the number of broadcasters doubled in 1996. Today, there are 127 radio and stations and 42 TV stations active in the Federation, and 83 radio and 29 TV stations in the Republika Srpska (RS). The RS is covered by the state (public) network RTV Republika Srpska with one TV and one radio channel. The Federation is covered by RTV BiH (now being restructured into RTV Federation BiH), also with one radio and one TV channel. National networks TV OBN and Radio FERN cover most territory in both entities. The development trend in the broadcasting media field in Bosnia-Herzegovina is shown in the next table:

Table 2.2-1: Development of broadcasters in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1991 to 2000

The reasons for the expansion of broadcasters should be sought in the fact that radio and especially television stations were an excellent instrument of ethnic, military, partisan and state propaganda, not only in war, but also for a long time after the war ended. In addition, most restrictions from the previous system that hampered the free establishment of broadcasters disappeared, which additionally stimulated the development of the media arena. Also, control over frequencies practically no longer existed, and technical and professional standards were under no supervision. For some owners, stations were a means of promotion, influence and prestige. International donors also abundantly helped in establishing private broadcasters, thereby stimulating the creation of a plural media arena in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The two most popular television stations in Bosnia-Herzegovina are public (state) stations: RTV BiH from Sarajevo – 25.90 percent, and RTV Republika Srpska – 14.40 percent of viewers out of the total auditorium. OBN, which covered the whole country during this research, was regularly watched by only 5.5 percent of the respondents. The best placed local stations in their respective communities were NTV Banja Luka (4.9 percent) and NTV Hayat from Sarajevo (2.9 percent). This confirms our above opinion that major influence is achieved by state broadcasting networks, whose restructuring into public services was overdue. As predicted, the most watched programs are TV news (20.8 percent), movies (13.9 percent) and soap operas (13.5 percent). Radio BiH is the most regularly followed radio station – 13.6 percent. The two other state (public) radio stations are followed regularly less often (Radio Republika Srpska – 5.1 percent, and Radio Herceg Bosna – 5.2 percent). The national network covering the whole country – Radio FERN – had a listening coefficient of only 3.6 percent. Among radio stations, there is less difference in popularity between public (state) and local stations than is the case with television. This shows a high level of competition on air and heavy dispersion in listening to radio programming.

The expansion of broadcasters has not been accompanied by better programming quality. In contrast to state and national networks, the majority of local stations have a simple program structure and rather poor technical quality. Radio stations generally broadcast on FM 24 hours a day. Medium waves have almost been abandoned. The majority of private local radio stations air most of their programs using commercial equipment and they broadcast short news agency items and produce call-in programs with listeners and commercials. Thanks to foreign donations, these stations have more so-called public service programming than is to be expected from commercial stations. Local radio stations owned by municipalities have inherited the pre-war concept: they follow local political events more ambitiously and most of them carry primetime news programs broadcast by state radio stations. Local TV stations have a similar editorial approach: a lot of music videos, movies and cheap serial programs. They broadcast an average of 3 to 12 hours of programming per day. It is characteristic of most radio and TV stations that they poorly cover events and issues at local level, which shows that most of them are not well profiled programming- or market-wise. Exceptions are TV Hayat based in Sarajevo, Alternativna and Nezavisna TV based in Banja Luka, cantonal TV stations in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica and Bihac, and a number of large municipal radio stations.

State (public) broadcasting networks have standard schedules such as all European public TV networks, but it is noticeable that even they have reduced them in favor of movies, sports and music. Drama programs and complex artistic programs have almost disappeared. A research project on the structure of TV programming carried out by Media Plan on May 1-28, 2000 at TV BiH and TV Republika Srpska showed that both stations have more developed entertainment programming than public service programming. To provide more insight into the character of programming of these two strongest television stations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we will show in percentages the types of programs broadcast:

Table 2.7-1: Weekly % average of types of program on RTVBH and RTRS (in the period from May 1 to 28, 2000)

Table 2.7-2: Weekly average of public service content on RTVBH and RTRS from May 1 to 28, 2000

None of the state (public) networks accomplish the obligatory weekly 40 percent of public service programming (news and other informative and educational programs). The reasons for such conduct are manifold: financial problems resulting in production (purchase) of cheap entertainment programs, lack of good professionals and resources for more complex programs, and the undefined quality of these broadcasters as public services. Hence, among the first tasks in restructuring the entity public broadcasters will be to enable them to produce 40 percent of public service programming. Local broadcasters registered as public services also have this obligation. The Independent Media Commission maintains that this will standardize the conditions of operation for public broadcasters and eliminate from the media market broadcasters that cannot perform this function.

TV OBN, consistent with the international community’s interest, developed into a public service to a large degree. Public service programming participated 42 percent in its overall programming, according to this research. Radio FERN initially broadcast a simple informative and music program, but in 1999 this was changed and the station was modeled into a “talk radio,” with frequent news and call-in programs, which is a novelty in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian radio space.

Lack of adequate copyright regulations and their adequate enforcement has given ground to the majority of broadcasters to air music, movies, satellite programming, even sports programs, without paying copyright fees. State (public) broadcasting networks fully adhere to copyright regulations. Practicing plagiary does not stimulate production and creates the feeling for station owners that programming comes cheap. Now copyright enforcement is controlled by the Independent Media Commission.

Local private and municipal radio and TV stations do not have enough resources for development and for producing their own quality programming or purchasing foreign programming. The private stations TV Hayat and Studio 99 from Sarajevo, Alternativna and Nezavisna TV from Banja Luka, and municipal and cantonal broadcasters in Tuzla, Zenica, Mostar and Bihac have more developed programs. Few of these stations make considerable revenues from marketing.

Most local broadcasters have a relatively modern technical foundation, which is a result of bigger investment of resources for this purpose on the part of the international community, as well as a result of following technical trends in the world. Technical equipment is sometimes in disproportion with creative potentials and quality of programming. Studio and field equipment is a combination of digital and analogous. A number of stations produce music recordings on classical sound carriers, the strongest ones being Radio BiH and Music Radio M from Sarajevo.

•  The Print Media:

The print media did not experience such turbulent development as broadcasters because they were not in the focus of public attention and had less influence in wartime political propaganda. Five daily newspapers now publish in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Three are based in Sarajevo – “Dnevni avaz,” “Vecernje novine” and “Oslobodjenje.” The latter two have long traditions, while “Avaz” started publishing after the war. “Glas srpski” (also with a long tradition) and “Nezavisne novine,” launched in 1997, are published in Banja Luka. “Glas srpski” is the only daily owned by the state. “Avaz,” although a private newspaper, used to be very close to the regime, but in mid-2000 a noticeable change was made towards independent editorial policy. “Oslobodjenje” and “Nezavisne novine” have independent editorial policies. “Vecernje novine” (meaning evening paper), which recently changed its name into “Jutarnje novine” (meaning morning paper), after privatization in 1999 continues to profile its own editorial policy.

Weekly newsmagazines are published regularly. In Sarajevo these are: “Dani” and “Slobodna Bosna” (of independent orientation), “Ljiljan” (represents Bosniak interests and is influenced by the ruling SDA), and “Hrvatska rijec” (represents Croat interests and is influenced by the ruling HDZ). In Banja Luka – “Nedjeljne nezavisne novine” and “Reporter” (of independent orientation), and “Republika” (published by the state-owned paper “Glas srpski”). In addition, several reviews are published in 15 or 10 day intervals, such as “Start BiH” (Sarajevo) and “Panorama” (Bijeljina).

According to Media Plan Institute data from August 2000, 130 print media are registered in Bosnia-Herzegovina which have different publishing intervals, but most of them are published with interruptions and irregularly for financial reasons.

As a result of earlier state monopoly, impoverished market and limited technical capacities, the printing and publishing business is underdeveloped. This is directly reflected on the economic position of the print media. The print media that fare best are those that have their own printing companies. Circulations are small due to the divisions of the market and the poor purchasing power of the population, as well as the significant presence of the press from neighboring countries. The majority of newspapers keep circulation figures as a business secret or exaggerate them, probably because owners maintain that publication of figures would cause doubt in their market value, decrease donor interest, and turn away potential advertisers. The next table presents data on circulations and the number of unsold copies in June of 2000.

CIRCULATION OF DAILY NEWSPAPERS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

CIRCULATION OF WEEKLY NEWSPAPERS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

According to data published by Mareco Index Bosnia, 45 percent of the population above the age of 18 regularly read newspapers. The majority of them – 43.3 percent – read newspapers only for politics. This finding is not consistent with earlier presented data that highest newspaper circulations do not exceed 28,000 copies, which means that one newspaper is read by several members in the family, at work, in the neighborhood. The most read weeklies are “Dani” – 7.5 percent, and “Slobodna Bosna” – 6.6 percent. The situation regarding daily newspapers is as follows: the Sarajevo “Dnevni avaz” is read regularly by 8.9 percent of respondents in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Far below are “Oslobodjenje” (2.9 percent), “Vecernje novine”/”Jutarnje novine” (2.2 percent), and “Nezavisne novine” (0.8 percent).

• News Agencies:

Three news agencies operate in Bosnia-Herzegovina which have daily services and a number of specialized services. The oldest is the state news agency BH Press (1992). During the war it experienced the same fate as all organizations at the level of the whole country: it became an agency of the authorities in Sarajevo under the control of the Bosniak political structure. The Republika Srpska Government founded a Serb news agency called SRNA in 1992, and the Government of the self-proclaimed Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna founded a Croat news agency called HABENA in 1993. A process of merging BH Press and Habena into a single news agency of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is currently underway. Although Bosnia-Herzegovina does not have a so-called national, or state agency, market-driven needs compel both entity agencies to cooperate with each other and expand their bureaus to cover all of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The only more developed private agency that has a daily service and specialized services is ONASA, which arose from an agency of the same name formed by the newspaper “Oslobodjenje.” In addition, there are a number of other smaller agencies in Bosnia-Herzegovina with specialized character. A service of information and commentary called SENSE operates out of Brussels and covers all European capitals involved in resolving the conflicts in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. As it is registered in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this agency may partly be viewed as being a Bosnian-Herzegovinian agency.

All in all, one may conclude that news agency journalism is rather underdeveloped and that the market is relatively small.

 2.3.  The Economic Position of the Media – Painful Revival of the Market

With the arrival of peace, international factors invested huge resources in the development of independent media outlets in order to establish a plural and independent media arena. In this regard, considerable assistance was allocated to media outlets that are not under strong control of local authorities. Considerable support was given to the development of new independent media in regions that lacked media organizations. In 1996 only, various sponsors donated around $5.17 million for development of independent and alternative media outlets in Bosnia-Herzegovina (ICG, 1997: 32-33). Biggest assistance in the past five years was given by the European Commission, Soros Foundation, USAID, and Council of Europe, as well as a number of governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations from Europe and the United States. Assistance from international and national organizations and foundations to independent and alternative media outlets in the Republika Srpska started after the signing of the Dayton Agreement. Less assistance was given to media outlets in Croat-majority parts of the Federation due to lack of cooperation on the part of local authorities. Media outlets under state control in Sarajevo and Banja Luka, except for some donations provided by political sponsors and some foreign donors, did not enjoy much financial support until they started restructuring into public services.

Particularly large investments in the media were made by the Soros Foundation, which has been active in Bosnia since 1993. By the beginning of 2000 it had invested exactly 7,583,307 German marks in the media. Soros redefined its role in Bosnia-Herzegovina as of 2000 and is no longer directly helping the media.

State-run (public) broadcasting networks are financed from so-called subscription fee (tax on possession of radio and TV sets), which amounts to 6 KM monthly. RTV BiH (Sarajevo) keeps the number of its subscribers as a business secret, which is incomprehensible for a public service that is supported for the most part from citizens’ money. Unofficial figures show that RTV BiH has around 300,000 subscribers, and that around 200,000 of them pay subscription fee, which is almost three times less than in the years before the war. According to a decision passed by the High Representative, RTV BiH and RTV Republika Srpska raise subscription fee together with the electricity bill. RTV BiH does this through the public electricity company. While citizens in the so-called Bosniak part of the Federation generally do pay subscription fee, in the so-called Croat part they often avoid this obligation with the explanation that this television “does not broadcast programming in the interest of the Croat people.”

The situation regarding RTV Srpska is even more difficult. There is an ongoing dispute between RTV Srpska, the Government, the power company Elektroprivreda, and the Postal Service, which had earlier raised the subscription fee, due to which this broadcaster has practically been left without income from this source.

Such confusion regarding financing of public broadcasting services is one of the reasons for the High Representative to undertake urgent measures.

The economic position of newspapers is very poor. The price of 1 KM for a daily newspaper (“Glas srpski” 0.50 KM) and 2 KM for weeklies (“Reporter” 1.50 KM) is able to cover the real costs only if at least 25,000 copies are sold. There are no big advertisers, and the state has recently introduced a daily newspaper tax of 12 percent, equalizing the news business (press and RTV) with highly accumulative economy. It remains to be seen what consequences these additional strains will have on press development in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but there are serious reasons for concern.

Actually, Bosnia-Herzegovina lacks a consistent and scientifically and professionally defined development strategy for the media as a business. The media in the local social environment are still considered an integral element of the political structures in whose function they operate. The international community is busy building their democratic role and only recently has there been talk about the media market and highly sophisticated technologies.

The entirely unenviable economic position of the majority of broadcasters and print media has reduced most journalists almost to beggary. Many journalists work “off the books,” without medical insurance or valid contracts, for low salaries (200 or 300 KM/DM monthly), which they receive with a big delay. In this regard there is no difference between state-run and private media outlets.

It is expected that privatization of former social, i.e. state-run media outlets will stimulate business initiative and create a healthy media market. Namely, until 1990 there were no private media outlets in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Privatization of state-owned media was interrupted by the war and continued only in 1999. So-called large privatization in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not encompass state broadcasters in the entities. Issuance of shares in the nation-wide public broadcasting service is not envisioned. A process of privatization of local media outlets is currently underway. Large daily newspapers in the Federation have already been privatized (“Oslobodjenje” and “Vecernje novine”). However, foreign capital still has not stepped into the field of Bosnian-Herzegovinian media and this field remains deprived of the inflow of fresh money essential for development.

This situation has led to dependence of existing media outlets on donations – the majority of local radio and TV stations, both private and public, live off donations or financial support from municipal authorities and benefits provided by municipalities (premises free of charge, etc.). Few media outlets are able to support themselves from commercials and advertisements. International donors have generally indicated a decrease, and even end of all forms of media financing, with the explanation that the media have been receiving stimulating injections over the past five years and now need to fight on the market on their own.

Independent experts, however, maintain that the time still has not come for complete withdrawal of the international community from this field: the media market is still underdeveloped and the social environment is still not democratic enough to enable independent media outlets to operate freely and without pressure. Still, donations will decrease, the market will start functioning, and strict international broadcasting standards will rapidly reduce the present expansion of the media arena.

Estimates of the size of the market of TV commercials in Bosnia-Herzegovina in October of 20008 show how serious the situation is: according to available data the size of the market is between 50 and 60 million DEM annually. However, as much as 50 to 70 percent of the market is taken by seven to 10 most powerful TV stations (RTVBH, RTRS, NTV HAYAT, OBN, ATV, TVBL, TVBEL), which means that the remaining 60 TV stations (71 TV stations in total were registered in 2000) at best dispose of some 20 to 30 million DEM annually. This means that these 60 TV stations have 0.3 – 0.5 million DEM available annually, which is insufficient for survival. One can conclude from this that the media in Bosnia-Herzegovina are facing a very difficult period of market selection. Only the most capable will survive.

 2.4.  Education

There are several key reasons that require serious engagement of all available educational potentials in the field of the media. First of all, the disintegration of the pre-war journalist community in Bosnia-Herzegovina has resulted in the appearance of a large number of young journalists without experience and without enough formal education, which inevitably reduces the quality of journalism. Another important factor that calls for considerable support to journalist education is the fact that during the war the media in Bosnia-Herzegovina had fallen behind new technologies. A third element is the need to eliminate inflammatory language and propaganda from journalistic practice, which had become dominant forms of journalistic expression during the recent war. In addition, new socio-political, economic and legal conditions require journalists and media professionals to acquire new knowledge in order to be able to adapt in the best possible way to the new circumstances.

Today journalist education in Bosnia-Herzegovina is taking place on two basic levels – in journalism departments at Universities, and outside of the academic framework through various seminars, workshops and journalism schools.

There are four departments of journalism in the country: at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Sarajevo, Philosophical Faculty in Tuzla, Teachers Training Faculty of the University of Mostar, and Philosophical Faculty in Banja Luka. These departments today enroll a total of 530 full-time and part-time students. Such a large number of journalism faculties and students is a consequence of entity, cantonal and national (ethnic) divisions of Bosnia-Herzegovina – everyone is educating their own journalists according to their own narrow territorial or ethnic interests. A common characteristic of these studies is a rather inflexible curriculum, burdened by inadequate theoretical subjects and without actual practical education for students.

The second form of education of journalists and media workers takes place outside of universities, through various courses, seminars, workshops, practice in media organizations, etc. This task has involved eminent media organizations from the world, but also trainers from abroad who are insufficiently competent and informed about the Bosnian media circumstances. Although such training, when well organized, certainly has a positive effect on the general level of media education, its primary flaw is that it is unsystematic, not harmonized and lacks continuity. The fact that a lot of money has been invested in education has not been taken advantage of well enough.

As an alternative to rigid and impractical university education and unsystematic education through crash courses and seminars, two independent journalism schools were established: BBC School of Journalism operating within Soros Media Center in Sarajevo, and Media Plan Institute School of Journalism operating in cooperation with the High College of Journalism from Lille, France. These schools offer systematic education of journalists with emphasis on practical skills. However, even these schools have their disadvantages. First of all, their programs need to be further developed and brought to a level that guarantees true specialization of journalists who attend them. The second flaw of these schools is that they are not part of the existing education system and their future is thus uncertain because they survive solely thanks to donations.

Academic journalism studies and well situated practical training of journalists are complementary forms of education that should be practiced in the future. Journalism studies should be freed of national and political character, and support should be given to practical education projects which are continuous and based on the highest standards of the profession and technology. The future of journalist education in Bosnia-Herzegovina certainly lies in more direct and long-term cooperation between faculties and institutions for practical training of journalists.

2.6. Developing Media Networks and Promoting Inter-Ethnic Communication

Following the creation of numerous independent media outlets at entity level, it was necessary to break down existing informative barriers and start eliminating ethnic segregation in communication, which characterizes the post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina. In order to accomplish this aim, OHR and OSCE directed a lot of effort into establishing inter-entity public broadcasting networks, as well as into press distribution throughout the country. The international community directly founded several media networks (AEM and BORAM), and a number of radio and TV stations which are either part of the mandate of international organizations (Radio and TV SFOR, RADIO MIR) or provide support to development of democracy and plural media space in Bosnia-Herzegovina (OBN, FERN).

In order to improve inter-ethnic relations and break down the information blockade, the international community helped establish a number of nation-wide radio and TV networks in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Radio Free Europe network encompassing 35 local radio stations, a network of Bosnian and Danish radio stations that provide information for Bosnian refugees, etc. A number of associations of broadcasters have been set up over the past two years.

The Association of Electronic Media BiH (AEM BiH) has 106 members (84 from the Federation and 21 from the Republika Srpska), which makes it the largest such association. It is supported by the American organization IrexProMedia. AEM’s members are both private and public media outlets with different political and national orientations. The aims of the association are to promote activities, transmit and broadcast TV and radio programming, enable favorable program purchase, enforce copyrights, take a common stand towards media legislators, etc. AEM’s activities last year were mostly aimed at establishing cooperation with the IMC, which resulted in the Association being accepted as an advisory body in passing rules. AEM was opposed to introducing broadcasting fees due to the extremely difficult position that most stations are in. This recommendation resulted in relatively low fees set down by the IMC.

The first initiatives and first financial impetus for business links among broadcasters have come from the international community. However, the real effects of these links are still small. Due to the lack of a media market and competition in quality, owners of broadcasters generally have shown no interest in this kind of programming and business linking. The situation regarding the Association of Newspaper Publishers is similar. The mentioned associations are still not profiled as associations of employers, which results in a mixture of professional and syndicate interests of journalists and other workers, business and market interests of owners, and efforts of the international community to influence democratization of the media environment through them.

The Open Broadcast Network (OBN) is a project that was first anticipated as a network of transmitters enabling existing independent TV stations from both entities to link. However, soon after establishment (September 1996), OBN started working as an independent enterprise under the guidance of the OHR. The purpose of OBN was to support democratization, freedom of expression and independent journalism through programs made available to all citizens in the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. To this purpose, international factors in 1996 and 1997 invested around $17.5 million in OBN’s development (ICG, 1997: 32-33; OBN Development Fact Sheet, 1998). Latest estimates show that around $20 million was spent in five years, most of it for leasing satellite connections for distributing signal to local affiliates’ transmitters.

Another important project on development of inter-ethnic communication is the radio station FERN (Free Election Radio Network). FERN is an internationally sponsored project that started operating on July 15, 1996. The station later lost the character of an election radio and was transformed program-wise into the first “talk radio” in Bosnia-Herzegovina. FERN is currently the only radio station which covers the entire territory of the country and which is universal in its approach to the different ethnic groups.

Local authorities for a long time obstructed the creation of the inter-entity media OBN and FERN. Due to systematic resistance, both these media outlets failed to exert expected influence on the 1996 and 1997 elections. OBN only started working seven days before the 1996 elections. It was only SFOR protection that enabled OBN and FERN transmitters to be installed, but the biggest part of program distribution between these stations and local affiliates even today takes place via costly satellite links.

The existence of these two networks for a long time provoked controversial reactions from the local public. If we put aside obstruction by local politicians, who were afraid of even the thought of independent and open media, the local journalist and media community justifiably maintained that these media outlets lacked a developed long-term strategy. Formally looking, both organizations are locally registered, but actually they are completely dependent on international donors and are run by foreigners: OBN under the auspices of the OHR and FERN under the auspices of the OSCE.

The international community for a long time put its money on a large number of small independent media outlets and these two national networks as the key to creating a democratic public opinion. Research, however, has shown that state broadcasters continue to have biggest influence, although for a long time they were beyond any serious reach of the international community, which did not have enough strength – or willingness – to take on the most serious media issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina – restructuring state-run media outlets into public services.

Following the High Representative’s definite decision to start restructuring state radio and television (1999 and 2000), international donors completely abandoned OBN, and Radio FERN also found itself in a lot of difficulty. Although they had played a big role in breaking down communication blockades in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the two broadcasters, especially OBN, are not organically situated in the country’s broadcasting system and they lack long-term development strategies. It is unknown who really owns their assets and whether they are public services by their character, as their programming indicates, or whether they are commercial broadcasters, as they are formally registered. Foreign donors, after the announced bankruptcy of OBN which had incurred millions of debts, decided to sell this TV station, while FERN will probably be included in the future public radio BiH. Thus, a comprehensive and very costly project of building OBN as the only supranational TV network in Bosnia-Herzegovina ended with a big fiasco.

The collapse of OBN should make all those who saw it as the future of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian media think twice. Representatives of the international community should particularly think twice about their conduct and strategy as they are the most responsible for the failure. It is a fact that OBN’s collapse was caused by irreconcilable interests of the most important factors, i.e. financiers in the international community, and by chronic lack of vision and long-term media development strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the decision-making circles.

This course of events also points to an incorrect evaluation of the local media arena and the relations in it. International factors have been neglecting local capacities and often without thinking, and sometimes even with belittlement, have imposed solutions that are not necessarily the most appropriate in the given context. OBN simply neglected the fundamental principles of successful media operation: non-existent target public, neglect of the media environment, failure to identify with the potential public, unresolved ownership status, lack of commercial strategy.

A banal example shows how little sensitivity was shown in creating the OBN project: the very name OBN (Open Broadcast Network) does not mean anything to the average Bosnian-Herzegovinian viewer because very few people in this country understand English. This raises the question of how can the public identify with something whose name means nothing to it. Unfortunately, the same mistake kept being repeated: IMC stands for Independent Media Commission, and the public service is called PBS (Public Broadcasting Service). As much as these may seem like formalistic issues, it is precisely this symbolic dimension of the media that has exceptional importance if one wants the established media, regulatory institutions and services to be completely integrated into not only the media system of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also society in general, because the media system is not an end in itself.

In order to develop a healthy and strong independent media arena, it must draw strength and meaning from local capacities: it certainly should not be installed from the outside and out of context. Hence, future international projects should be based on partnership relations with local organizations and should fully respect the specific local characteristics – the condition of their sustainability.

 2.7. Restructuring Public TV Enterprises and Building a State Public Service12

High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch passed a decision on October 23 which lays out the framework of a public broadcast system in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The essence of the decision is that three main broadcasters are created in BiH – PBS (Public Broadcasting Service – a country-wide public service), RTV Federation BiH, and RTV Republika Srpska, which are to be transparently financed and professionally run for the benefit of all citizens in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The present RTV BiH shall continue to broadcast until the PBS and RTV Federation, to which its resources will be transferred, really start to function.13

In July of 1999 the High Representative passed a decision to “phase out” the present RTV BiH and transform it into the PBS and RTV Federation BiH, and to reorganize RTV Republika Srpska, which would remain an entity television station, but would be more oriented towards cooperation with the federal television and state public service. The same decision abolished a Croat TV network in the Federation called EROTEL, which was actually an extended arm of Zagreb-based Croatian RTV and the Zagreb regime which controlled it. A transfer agent was named, who directly answers to the High Representative, which shows that the international community will continue to watch over this process.

The High Representative by his latest decision formed an Interim Transmission Corporation (ITC), which practically takes over all transmission sites and transmitters from RTVBiH and RTRS with all the other transmission infrastructure. Similar solutions exist in some countries, and in this case it was applied to enable rational exploitation and prevent abuse of the transmission system for partial political purposes. The entity broadcasters are to transfer to the new corporation both transmitter maintenance staff and monies currently reserved for maintenance of transmitters. The ITC is later to be financed on the basis of agreement on program distribution with the entity broadcasters.

All three public broadcasters (Public Broadcasting Service BiH, Federation RTV and RTRS) will later be able to use the capacities of the present RTV BiH building, but these services will also be commercially available to other RTV producers.14 The High Representative’s decision also states that all equipment procured in the future must be digital or compatible with a digital environment.

 2.7.1. Can Public Broadcasting Service BiH Become a True National-Wide Broadcaster?

PBS BiH is the public broadcaster for the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It may operate throughout the territory of BiH, including the District of Brcko. The PBS mission is to provide informational, educational, entertainment and cultural programming for all parts of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, reflecting the national and cultural diversity of BiH. PBS will for now develop an evening schedule on one television channel and a full broadcasting day on one radio channel. PBS radio will be broadcasting predominantly on FM, although, as needed, it has overall right to the AM frequency. However, before it starts broadcasting on its own frequencies, PBS will provide its programming to be transmitted to the entity broadcasters in prime viewing time. This practice is already underway, but mostly related to international sports games, because PBS has still not started its own production.

PBS BiH holds all rights and responsibility for all RTV BiH intellectual property and programming rights, including the television and radio archives. It also holds all rights for satellite broadcasting to the BiH and diaspora. This service will contain material from both PBS and entity broadcasters. PBS will hold BiH membership in the European Broadcasting Union (EBU/UER). PBS will have a significant role in purchasing expensive entertainment, film and sports content, which will alleviate the financial burden on entity broadcasters.

 2.7.2. The Role of Entity Public Broadcasters in the New System

The Decision states that RTV Federation BiH will be a program producer and broadcaster for public needs in the Federation. It is mandated to produce two radio networks and two channels of television (now it broadcasts on one channel each). These services will be complementary and mixed. Each will reflect national and cultural diversities, and will be staffed by people chosen on the basis of professional criteria in accordance with the principle of national equality. In other words, it will respect the national quota system, and take care that Bosniaks and Croats as the majority peoples in the Federation are represented in its programming, as well as Serbs. It is specified that all official languages in BiH will be used. Practically, the High Representative has abandoned the idea of RTV FBiH being a solely Bosniak-Croat broadcaster, because only full equality of peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina is in accordance with the latest BiH Constitution Court decision on constituency of peoples in all parts of Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory.

RTV Republika Srpska will continue the existence of the broadcaster that appeared during the war. However, in order for RTRS to adapt to its new role in the public information system in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Decision specifies that it will restructure its management and accommodate the station, both in the technical and in the journalistic sense, to cooperate with PBS and RTV FBiH. It will continue to broadcast a single radio network and one television channel, but it will have to recruit from all the three peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has not been the case so far, because it now employs only Serbs.

Both entity broadcasters will contain at least 40% domestically produced programs. A significant proportion of the programs must be commissioned from independent producers. The aim should be to achieve 10% of domestic production from this source within three years.

 2.7.3. A Long-Term Strategy as a Precondition for Survival of the New System

The new system takes into account the mutual interests of the three broadcasting companies, which will remain independent, but will work together to improve the public service in both entities and across the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The production capability of both entity broadcasters will be significantly enhanced by the implementation of this decision. This is the reason why financial participation of the entity broadcasters towards PBS is envisioned, as it will initially not be financially sustainable.

Both broadcasters may be financed through viewers’ and listeners’ subscription fees, appropriations from the general public budget, and revenue resulting from advertising. It is recommended to continue to have agreements with public electric companies for the raising of subscription fees. The international community will in the beginning technically, and even financially, help to establish this system. It is maintained that a combination of budget and commercial funds, as well as funds from TV subscription fee, will enable the establishment of self-sustainable media, which will be financed transparently and prevent potential political party interference aimed at creating political dependence.

However, there is justifiable concern that it will be difficult to raise such a complex and costly system, because Bosnia-Herzegovina lacks sufficient financial and creative capacities. Learning a lesson from the negative experience of OBN, all important factors involved in building the Public Service at state and entity level should develop a long-term sustainability and development strategy for such a complex project. This strategy, in addition to political, legal and economic aspects, must offer a detailed program structure adapted to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s specific characteristics. Any other approach would be doomed to failure (also see Udovicic, Zoran, 2000).

  2.8. Journalist Associations as a Reflection of Ideological and Political Divisions

Five journalist associations operate in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Such a large number is a result of ethnic, entity, and even ideological and political divisions among journalists and the media. None of the associations gather journalists from all over Bosnia-Herzegovina, although the names of some of the associations suggest that they cover the whole country.

In the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina there are three associations: Association of Journalists BiH (which claims to be the successor of the tradition of the pre-war Association of Journalists BiH) and Union of Professional Journalists BiH (founded in 1996 by a group of journalists who maintained that the management of the Association was too close to the incumbent regime). Both organizations gather journalists from all Bosnian-Herzegovinian ethnic groups. The Association of Croat Journalists of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina gathers exclusively Croat journalists. In the Republika Srpska there is the Association of Journalists of Republika Srpska, founded at the very beginning of the war, and Independent Union of Journalists RS (founded in 1997).

The international community has abundantly helped the two independent journalist unions. Relations have been developed among journalist associations thanks to international organizations that provide support to professional journalism. However, in the journalist community these associations do not enjoy a particularly high reputation because they have not been able to carry out any activities that would have a significant impact on the professional and existential position of journalists. Professional solidarity has been hampered by ethnic and political confrontation, whose consequences are still visible in their work. A poor syndicate position contributes to the poor position of journalists. The work of two syndicate organizations in the Federation and Republika Srpska is almost unnoticeable.

 2.9. Media Freedom in Bosnia-Herzegovina15

The American Association for Research in Human Rights, “Freedom House,” in its 2000 Media Report placed Bosnia-Herzegovina among countries that had only partly free media in 1999. Bosnia-Herzegovina received 56 points, which is actually very close to the category in which the media are not free (61 – 100 points).

In addition to the still present confusion in the field of media legislation, there is considerable political pressure, as well as additional pressure resulting from the difficult material position of the media and lack of a media market. Attacks on media freedom in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be categorized into several groups: attacks on the physical integrity of journalists, news organizations, and production and broadcasting facilities; intimidation of journalists; pressure on editors and authors of articles. Journalist non-freedom is favored by closed sources of information, difficult economic situation of the media, and lack of journalist solidarity (Babic, Dusko and Udovicic, Zoran, 2000).

The extent to which journalists and their media in BiH are imperiled can be best illustrated by the example of Zeljko Kopanja. After publishing an article on war crimes, the editor in chief of the Banja Luka-based “Nezavisne novine,” Zeljko Kopanja, was seriously injured by a bomb which blew up his automobile on October 22, 1999. The monstrous attack occurred after a series of articles in “Nezavisne novine” on financial and other abuses committed by Republika Srpska government officials. It is believed that Serb ultra-nationalists’ rage was particularly provoked by a series of articles in which, for the first time in this entity using investigative procedure, a medium opened a dossier on crimes committed by Serb extremists against Bosniaks, Croats and other non-Serbs during the recent war.

A survey, carried out by Internews among representatives of 50 media outlets in March of 2000, painted a rather bleak picture of the media situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina – 92 percent of journalists maintain that the state of journalist rights is unsatisfactory. Speaking about current trends, 50 percent answered that the degree of jeopardy of journalists was rising. Seventy-four percent of the survey’s participants feels that their freedom of expression and movement is restricted, while 62 percent in the course of their duties encountered intimidation and interference, including direct or indirect pressure on the part of political parties and elected or appointed government officials. One one-third of the respondents believe that the local judicial system guarantees their rights.

The survey showed that journalists in Bosnia-Herzegovina have not reported many incidents. If they do decide to report them, however, they report such cases to international organizations or journalist associations rather than to the police.

All this shows that the media and journalists are still in an unenviable position with regard to local authorities and non-institutional power centers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Pressure on journalists is a regular phenomenon, not an exception. The judicial system in Bosnia-Herzegovina not only is not ready yet to offer them appropriate protection and guarantee their political independence and freedom, but is also not able to guarantee even pure physical safety to those journalists who dare to confront with the ruling structures.

 5. THE MEDIA LEGISLATION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

 The media portrait of Bosnia-Herzegovina is determined to a large extent by the organization of the state and judiciary and the overall unfavorable political constellation. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a community with an extremely complicated and complex state structure. One of its important characteristics is enormous territorial and political division in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which consists of 10 cantons, and pronounced centralism in the Republika Srpska, the other Bosnian-Herzegovinian entity.

The best illustration of the argument about a complex, actually unique state construction, is its constitutional matter. The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina is an integral part of a treaty – the Dayton Peace Agreement – which practically does not deal with media issues. Annex 3 only superficially mentions the significance of the media in election period in the context of the OSCE role, while Annex 4, i.e. Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, places the media field in the jurisdiction of the entities. This today remains the main obstacle to all attempts to establish single standards, at the level of the whole state, and even the Federation entity, for freedom of information and unimpeded flow of information.

The succeeded media legislation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is inconsistent and practically invalid. During the war in the three ethnically divided territories, laws were in effect which were succeeded and taken over from the former common state of Yugoslavia, or were copied or directly rested on regulations in the two neighboring countries – Croatia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This situation lasted two years after the war because the authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina were unable to agree on the character of media legislation, and who has jurisdiction in passing media legislation. The first form of international intervention in this field was an ad hoc body within the OSCE Mission to BiH: Media Election Commission (MEC). In April of 1997 a Media Experts Commission (MEC) was established, which was the first independent regulatory body for the media in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see Domi, 1998).

However, after negative experiences from 1996 and 1997, the international community drastically changed its approach to problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly with regard to the media. It decided not to make any more deals with the incompetent and mutually confronted authorities, which were doing all they could to prevent the passing of regulations consistent with contemporary European standards and in accordance with the new constitutional organization of the state (see Weeler and Media Plan Institute, 1996/97). The crucial moment was when a declaration was adopted by the Peace Implementation Council conference in Sintra on May 30, 1997, which gave the OHR broad powers in approaching media issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The most significant decision is the power given to the High Representative to shape and suspend any media network whose program is in constant and drastic violation of the letter or spirit of the peace agreement (OHR, 1998a). In December of 1997, a Peace Implementation Council conference in Bonn instructed the OHR to establish a body called the Independent Media Commission (IMC), which was to take over the powers of the MEC and receive additional powers. The IMC was established in mid-1998. We will focus more attention on this body in section 5.7 of this paper. Meanwhile, the High Representative passed a number of decisions, starting in 1998, which regulate important issues in the field of information and public broadcasting, and imposed several laws that will remain in effect until appropriate laws are passed by local representative bodies. Such a dynamic situation led to overlapping and confrontation in many fields of media legislation between provisions in local laws and provisions passed by the international factors in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the international community cautions that regulations passed by international peace implementing agencies in Bosnia-Herzegovina have precedence over all local regulations.

Alongside the undoubted significance of this intervention, it has a negative consequence in that it establishes the international community as almost the only legislator in the media field. Local representative bodies and authorities in the entities have been completely deactivated by this decision, and local professional services remain passive and unequipped for this task. As a result, the local community has almost no responsibility in passing legislation and strategically attending to development of this field, in particular regarding broadcasting. Such a passive attitude on the part of the local authorities is not good in the long run because the new system needs considerable support from local structures and power centers in order to survive. For, after all, the local authorities will be the ones who will bear ultimate responsibility for the functioning of the regulatory framework, not only due to the fact that the international factors will not remain in this country forever.

5.1. The Media and Information Legislation

Journalist and media freedom in principle is guaranteed by the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the constitutions of the two entities. The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Annex 4 of the General Framework Agreement on Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, refers to freedom of expression (Article II, 3) and guarantees fundamental human rights consistent with existing international standards.16 The part of the Constitution of BiH pertaining to jurisdiction of the institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and jurisdiction of the entities does not specify how the field of public information is to be regulated.

The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand, specifies (Section III, Article 1, Subsection h) that “The Federation Government shall have exclusive responsibility regarding allocation of electronic frequencies for radio, television, and other purposes.” Article 4, Item i specifies that cantons shall have all responsibility for “making policy concerning radio and television facilities, including decisions concerning regulation and provision thereof.”

Distinction between rights regarding allocation of frequencies from rights regarding establishment of broadcasting organizations (print media are not mentioned specifically anywhere in the Constitution) seems to have been understood as a definitive division of jurisdiction in the legal sphere. Today there is no single law on public information at state level, or the level of the Federation, but only at the level of (some) cantons in the Federation. The latest Law on Public Information at state level was passed by the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on July 30, 1990.

 5.2. Entity and Cantonal Laws on Public Information

Jurisdiction in the field of information in the Republika Srpska lies at entity level. The Law on Public Information from 1997 and Law on Radio and Television from 1996 are applied. The Law on Public Information proclaims freedom of information and prohibits censorship, and specifies how media outlets are to be established and edited. It stipulates “prevention of press distribution and circulation of information if it calls for violent overthrowing of the system and violation of territorial integrity and independence,” publication of statements, replies and corrections, responsibility of the publisher and editor in chief, etc.

However, the law does not contain any provisions on free access to information, protection of sources of information, rights of journalists, and also lacks a number of other provisions on media standards. However, it does contain a whole chapter on prohibition of circulation of information and press distribution, powers of courts and the police in such cases, the right to reply and correction, and the obligation to publish or broadcast statements issued by state bodies which are of particular significance and urgent nature.

The Law on Radio and Television regulates the frequency spectrum and frequency allocation procedure, establishment of the Public Enterprise Serb Radio Television, editorial policy, management, raising of subscription fee, etc. The frequency allocation decision is passed by the Government, which specifies the allocation conditions and amount of fee. It is precisely these powers that are in conflict with the powers of the IMC, whose decisions have precedence over all local regulations.

In the Federation, powers in the field of information lie at canton level. However, the High Representative considered it illogical that the field of the public broadcasting service, as well as the issue of free access to information, remained outside of entity jurisdiction. Therefore, he requested and then imposed two laws as single laws for the whole Federation. Meanwhile, activities were conducted regarding passing of cantonal laws in this field. These laws have so far been passed by six cantons, drafts and bills have been prepared by two other cantons (Tuzla Canton and Bosansko Podrinje Canton), while the remaining two cantons (Herzegovina-Neretva Canton and Central Bosnia Canton) have yet to do so. Laws regulating relations in this field are in six cases entitled Law on Public Information (Tuzla Canton, Zenica-Doboj Canton and Una-Sana Canton), and in two (Sarajevo Canton and Bosansko Podrinje Canton) they are called Law on Media.

This difference is not only formal: The Law on Media in Sarajevo Canton is the only law which focuses more profoundly on the functioning of broadcasters. Its intention is to encompass all regulations (even potential self-regulation) in the field of the media. Although the Law to a large degree applies contemporary world standards, the effort to pass too many norms is not consistent with the international community’s general orientation to leave more room, especially in the field of the media, to self-regulation.

All cantonal laws explicitly guarantee freedom of public expression and freedom of the press. The majority of laws (except in Zenica-Doboj Canton) explicitly ban press censorship and they all emphasize that the media are free in developing and implementing editorial policy based on respect for professional ethical standards. They also specify that all media outlets under equal conditions have the right to access all events and information of public interest.

Sanctions are envisioned for government institutions which fail to pass regulations on transparency of their work. Four of the six above laws also envision sanctions for officials who refuse to provide the press with public interest information (Sarajevo Canton and Zenica-Doboj Canton do not have this provision). In addition, situations are anticipated in which state and public institutions have the right to deny requested information to the press. In the majority of the laws, this restriction refers to affairs and information which are considered, by the law or other regulations based on the law, to be a state, military or official secret. Only in Sarajevo Canton is the law somewhat more specific (Article 23) as it states that this restriction refers to information “whose publication may affect state security or defense, or may jeopardize international relations, law enforcement, public security, privacy, or a business secret.17

All in all, restrictions in freedom of information stipulated by cantonal regulations may be reduced to the following: protection of privacy, prohibiting instigation of violence, ethnic or racial hatred, prohibiting publication of pornographic content, prohibiting collecting information in an illegal manner, and restrictions regarding broadcasting advertisements. All cantonal laws, with the exception of the Zenica-Doboj Canton law, guarantee journalists the right to protect confidentiality of sources of their information.18

In comparison to pre-war legislation, the new cantonal laws have considerably simplified the procedure for founding media outlets. The law in Sarajevo Canton specifies that commercial and non-commercial media outlets may be founded by both legal entities and physical persons, without making any distinction between domestic and foreign persons. The majority of the other laws also do not stipulate such restrictions, except for the law in Zenica-Doboj Canton, which prevents foreign legal entities and physical persons from being media founders and publishers. If they (foreign persons) have stock in the total capital of a public media organization, it is limited to 49 percent of the total value of capital.

In cantons with Croat majority population, as well as Una-Sana Canton, the law prescribes an obligation for legal persons – who are in the public information business – to deliver the details of persons who hold 10 or more percent of stock, to the responsible ministry at the beginning of each calendar year.

The main flaws in the cantonal laws, as underlined in the Special Report by the Ombudsmen of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina of May 16, 2000, are that they go into unnecessary detail (provisions on who may be a journalist, editor and editor in chief, what kind of ID street vendors should carry, etc.), punitive provisions are not harmonized, participation of foreign capital is limited, and, most of all, the earlier practice of mandatory registration of media outlets with executive government bodies is retained. The Institution of Ombudsmen of the Federation recommended the parliaments and governments in the Federation and its cantons to erase all provisions requiring media outlets to be registered with ministries “for information affairs,” and suggested that media outlets should only be registered with courts, as in most developed democracies. It also recommended that ministries for information should be abolished on all government levels where they exist, be it independently or as part of ministries for education, culture and sports.

The character and range of punitive provisions contained in the cantonal laws additionally reveal the real nature of the authorities’ attitude towards the media. Media publishers’ and editors’ failure to register their media outlets or supply new details on time is punished much more strictly than, for example, unlawful denial on the part of responsible government officials to provide journalists with information important to the public.19

The atomization of media legislation on four levels (cantonal, entity, state and international community mandate) with 14 subjects empowered to pass and control media legislation, is by no means a reflection of a high level of democratization and professionalism in this field. On the contrary – it maintains confusion.

 5.3. Legal Regulation of Libel and Defamation

Using his powers, the international community’s High Representative to Bosnia-Herzegovina on July 30, 1999 announced the “Decision on Freedom of Information and Decriminalization of Libel and Defamation.” The decision required that both entities, under the guidance of the Office of the High Representative, adopt the necessary legislation to create civil remedies for defamation, libel and slander in accordance with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms…”20

In his elaboration of the decision, the High Representative stated that “the existence and use of these criminal provisions have had a chilling effect on journalistic freedom in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Libel and defamation in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina are regulated by the Penal Code.21 The possibility of pronouncing a prison sentence of three months to three years is envisioned for these criminal acts.22

The new laws in both entities have inherited, if not entirely, the approach to the criminal acts of libel and defamation from the previous communist system. The new formulations, as the old ones, practically provide for trial for the so-called verbal offense (“who shall declare or circulate something untrue about someone…,” and “who shall defame someone…”).23 Formulations in the laws of the Federation and the Republika Srpska fail to state precisely that legal action may be initiated only for declaring false or incorrect facts. Due to this, the phrase “something untrue” may also be used to refer to value judgments (opinions and comments), which should not be the subject of court suits because facts oblige, but opinion is free.

Based on an overview of court practice, one can conclude that criminal suits against journalists have become quite common. The Special Report on Freedom of Information and Legal Regulation of Libel and Defamation in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, published by the Ombudsmen of the Federation on December 22, 1999, states that in 1997 and 1998 Sarajevo Municipal Court received 56 libel and defamation cases, of which more than 80 percent were related to the press (suits against journalists and editors). In 1999 eight new suits were filed against journalists and editors. Only one of the new cases ended in a first-instance verdict with the pronouncing of a three-month suspended sentence with one year of probation to the editor in chief of the weekly “Slobodna Bosna.” Three cases were wrapped up that year against journalists which had been initiated in the previous years (one acquittal and two suspended sentences). According to Sarajevo Municipal Court data, most suits in the last three years were filed against the editor in chief of “Slobodna Bosna” (13) and editor in chief of “Dani” (5). In the majority of cases, the plaintiffs were political and public figures and officials.24

The Penal Code of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina contains two other anachronisms, which were also succeeded from the communist system. The first is that “impairing the reputation of the state and its symbols, as well as its constituent peoples and others who live in Bosnia-Herzegovina” constitutes a “grave criminal act.” The envisioned sentence is from three months to three years.25 The second, even bigger, anachronism is that prosecution for these criminal acts, as well as for criminal acts of libel and defamation “…committed against a state body or official or military person regarding their official work…” shall be undertaken – ex officio.26

In addition to criminal proceedings, under the laws of the Federation it is also possible to file suit for compensation of non-material and material damages for violation of honor and reputation. This legal possibility, however, has been rarely used in cases of libel and defamation in the press. Persons who considered their rights to have been violated almost with no exception insisted on criminal proceedings, and only rarely, in case of a favorable outcome, did they file civil suit. In 1999 only two cases were reported in which private plaintiffs filed civil suit against the media and journalists without filing criminal charges, and received compensation for non-material damage – from “Vecernje novine” (20,000 KM) and from Croat Radio Orasje and its editor in chief (almost 10,000 KM).

The decision taken by the High Representative to Bosnia-Herzegovina on decriminalization of libel and defamation, announced on July 30, 1999, is inconsistent it itself. According to the first subsection, it abolishes only imprisonment, but does not abolish the criminal acts themselves.27 Based on this inconsistency, courts have found room to continue the practice of trying criminal cases even after the High Representative’s decision, although this is obviously contrary to his intention. Criminal cases are tried in this way even today. A court in Sarajevo in mid-October of 2000 passed judgment against two journalists, sentencing them for the criminal act of libel with a three-month suspended sentence with one year of probation. The Court President later took disciplinary measure against the judge who passed the judgment.

The High Representative on the same occasion required both entities, under the guidance of the Office of the High Representative, to adopt the necessary legislation to create civil remedies for defamation, libel and slander in accordance with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms…” and specified that this action must be completed “no later than 30 December, 1999.”

As neither entity took any action in the next several months, the Office of the High Representative on November 11, 1999 formed an advisory group on legal regulation of libel and defamation and drafting a law on freedom of information. The group consists of representatives of the governments of both entities, local and international experts, and representatives of the OHR, OSCE and IMC. To date (October/November 2000), the group has not announced a draft law creating civil remedies for defamation, libel and slander.

However, on December 16, 1999, the Federation Government passed a Draft Law on compensation of damage caused by libel and defamation and referred it to the Federation Parliament for adoption in expedited procedure. The Draft, according to the Ombudsmen of the Federation,28 “does not constitute a good foundation for establishing balance in encouraging freedom of expression and freedom of the press and at the same time protecting the honor and reputation of any citizen of this country.” The Ombudsmen assessed the draft law as being completely unacceptable both due to the qualification of the terms libel and defamation, which were taken over from the Penal Code of the Federation and the previous communist system, and due to the specified fines in amounts which are absolutely above the material potentials of journalists and the press in general (ranging from 2,000 to 10,000 KM for journalists and from 20,000 to 100,000 KM for publishers). “The amounts of these damages constitute a real threat to freedom of the press and an inducement to journalistic self-censorship.”29

The Federation Ombudsmen recommended radical changes in the Draft and suggested symbolic fines for journalists (1 KM) and publication of the court verdict in its entirety if the court accepts the plaintiff’s suit. The Draft was also strongly criticized by journalist organizations. Soon after that, on January 18, 2000, the High Representative and the head of the OSCE called on the Federation Prime Minister to revoke the Draft Law.

 5.4. The Law on Free Access to Information

In the above Decision of July 30, 1999, the High Representative stipulated that a Law on Freedom of Information is to be prepared by the end of the year consistent with laws in democratic countries. This decision was actually initiated by the Peace Implementation Council for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which in its Madrid Declaration of December 16, 1998 underlined the urgency of passing a Law on Freedom of Information in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The international community has thus directed its efforts into harmonizing local legislation with international standards and creating a single legal framework as a foundation for reinforcing a free and plural media scene in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The advisory group, consisting of representatives of governments of both entities, local and foreign experts, and representatives of the OHR, OSCE and IMC, announced on June 28, 2000, after months of work, the Draft Law on Freedom of Information in Bosnia-Herzegovina (at state level) and Draft Laws on Freedom of Information for both entities.

The Law specifies that any person has the right to access information possessed by the Government and other public bodies. The aim is to make as much information available to the public as possible at the lowest acceptable cost. The Law also gives individuals the right to correct personal details possessed by public bodies and give their comments on them.

These draft laws define three categories of information that may be exempted from publication/disclosure. The first is related to the functions of public bodies (if publication would cause “considerable damage” to the “legitimate goals” of foreign policy, defense and security interests, protection of public security, monetary policy interests, prevention of crime and disclosure of crime, and protection of decision-making process). The second category of exemptions refers to protection of commercially sensitive information on private enterprises or third parties. The third category of exemptions stipulates protection of privacy of other persons. This kind of information, however, is not generally exempted. Decision on exemption is made from case to case, after a so-called test of public interest. Non-publication, hence, is an exception, not a rule.30

Although these laws do not refer exclusively to journalists and the press, but to all citizens and the public in general, they are actually the cornerstone of all civil freedoms, including media freedom. They create a mechanism of constant testing and control of the authorities and at the same time generate trust of citizens and respect for the authorities. These drafts are not only consistent with contemporary laws in democratic countries; in some elements they are above them. Still, it is not expected that these laws will be implemented without resistance, for it is precisely the public sector that is today characterized by lack of transparency. Even Radio Television BiH, a media organization and at the same time a public interest organization, continues to hold back information on RTV subscription fee, saying that these figures are confidential, although it should have to be under absolute public control.

 5.5. The Press Council

One of the most important breakthroughs in continuous attempts towards media democratization and the media self-regulation process in Bosnia-Herzegovina was partly made in 1998 and especially in 1999 and 2000. The Independent Media Commission announced on August 1, 1998 the Broadcast Code of Practice, which was amended on several occasions over the next two years. The Independent Media Commission also announced an Election Code for the Media on March 31, 1999 (amended on February 10, 2000). It is noticeable that more room for self-regulation was left to the press than to broadcasters, which is consistent with the basic strategy in the field of media regulation implemented by the international community.

Following that, the six journalist organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina31 agreed upon a Press Code and signed it on April 29, 1999. The Press Code states: “Journalists and their publications have an obligation to the public to maintain high ethical standards at all times and under all circumstances. It is the duty of journalists and publishers to respect the needs of citizens for useful, timely and relevant information and to defend the principles of freedom of information and the right to fair comment and critical journalism.”32

The Press Code prescribes the responsibility of journalists and editors to ensure in all their work a respect for factual truth and the right of the public to know the truth. It establishes the obligation of the media not to incite or inflame hatred, discrimination or intolerance. Among other things, it establishes the fundamental ethical principles of factual and fair reporting, distinguishing clearly between comment, conjecture and fact, protection of children and minors, protection of the accused, and the right of citizens to privacy.

As the Independent Media Commission – under a Decision taken by the High Representative on June 11, 1999 on establishing the IMC – was given full competence in the license allocation procedure and regulation of professional norms for radio and television programming, a void appeared in self-regulation in the field of the print media following the adoption of the Press Code. The void was filled with the establishment of a Press Council, a body that represents the media (the press and journalists and editors) and consumers (the public). The same organizations that agreed on the establishment of the Press Council reached agreement to form a single Press Council for Bosnia-Herzegovina in the second half of 2000, after several months of discussion. The initiators and the main driving force behind all these projects were representatives of the international community (IMC, OSCE, IREX ProMedia and others) and local journalist organizations and editorial boards of certain newspapers and broadcasters. The Press Code is the first common document passed by journalist associations in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the war, and the Press Council is the first nation-wide multiethnic institution established by agreement of interested organizations. The long period of harmonization among journalist organizations is a consequence of the fact that there is such a large number of these organizations, which are divided along ethnic and political lines.

The Council was constituted on September 22, 2000 and consists of six journalists (press representatives from across Bosnia-Herzegovina), six public workers (representatives of the public from across Bosnia-Herzegovina), and a chairman who is a foreigner (the first chairman is at the same time the president of the British Press Complaints Commission). The Press Council operates on the basis of the Press Code.

The primary task of the Council is to review citizens’ and public complaints against press reports and to resolve disputes in a simple manner, quickly and free of charge. “The Council shall try to resolve each complaint on the basis of fairness, civility and common sense and shall only use journalistic tools,” according to the harmonized working text establishing the Press Council. “Journalistic tools” include: publishing the Council’s stands in full, in a visible place, by the criticized publication; publishing findings in a bulletin or regular report, and following the resolution of each case, in the form of a public statement in the media. The Council is not empowered to punish, suspend, imprison or withdraw licenses from newspapers and publications.

The Council is formally due to start operating in January of 2001. The Council will have a small professional secretariat, headed by a director. International organizations will provide financing for its first year of work.

 5.6. The Institution of Ombudsmen

The Institution of Ombudsmen on Human Rights has been operating in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1995, headed by three ombudsmen with equal powers and obligations. Within the Institution, the position of special assistant on media was opened on November 1, 1999. Such as institution was also formed in the Republika Srpska in mid-2000, but for the time being there is no one holding any job similar to that of an assistant ombudsmen on media.

The rights and obligations of the special media assistant in the Federation are harmonized with the general rules on the work of the Institution and specific responsibilities regarding protection of media freedoms, on one hand, and protection of the public from media abuse, on the other.

In the framework of his powers, the special media assistant operates as an intermediary between the public and the media in cases of opposed requests and tries to speed up solutions that satisfy both sides in the simplest way possible.

 5.7. IMC – The Independent Media Commission

The Independent Media Commission (IMC) was formed on July 11, 1998 by a decision of the High Representative. Formal ground for what is essentially a political decision was found in Annex 10 of the Agreement on Implementation of Civil Aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Namely, top priority for the creators of the Dayton Agreement was cessation of armed conflict, which they succeeded in bringing about. However, events on the ground were threatening to jeopardize this key result of the Dayton Agreement. Inflammatory and extremely biased reporting, which had speeded up the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, continued with unyielding intensity. Even more fiercely, because the results of the war were horrible, memories and its protagonists alive, and the peace agreement fragile.

Flaws made by the Dayton Agreement tried to be rectified by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), first in Sintra (May 1997), and then in Bonn in December of the same year. A decision was made to form the Independent Media Commission, and the agency became operational on August 1, 1998.

The IMC’s first task was to establish a process which eliminates direct political influence on the media exerted by ruling nationalist structures, and to gradually accustom the media to generally accepted European standards and norms. In the next PIC meeting in Luxembourg, the IMC, in addition to regular competences, was also given a mission of support to the media in the process of their reconstruction. It seems that this broader power was entrusted upon the Commission in Luxembourg, along with the initial “regulate and sanction” formula. Due to a lack of political will on the part of local authorities to regulate the state of anarchy in media legislation and bring it into harmony with the Dayton Agreement, the IMC in time became the key expert body on which the international community relied in the process of media reconstruction. In the field of broadcasters, the IMC was a substitute both for legislators and self-regulation, while with regard to print media it maintained a status of consultation and assistance.

 5.7.1. The Mandate and Structure of the IMC

The regulatory part of the IMC mandate encompasses: licensing all broadcasters, managing the frequency spectrum and creating appropriate codes, rules and guidelines binding all broadcasters in Bosnia-Herzegovina. All IMC rules have precedence over local media legislation, and the IMC is defined and recognized as the only and supreme regulatory body for the terrestrial broadcasting network in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For now, the IMC is not in charge of satellite and cable television and the Internet, including digital audio-visual services, which all fall under the term broadcasters.

An important component of the complex and responsible mandate of the IMC is: monitoring the media in order to identify breaches of licensing conditions and rules, setting down licensing fees, receiving complaints and sanctioning violations of licensing conditions. The June 11 decision also states that the IMC will transfer its function to manage the frequency spectrum and allocate broadcasting frequencies to an appropriate state agency, which will be established under the law on telecommunications. It is also essential to underline that it was initially envisioned that the IMC’s international component would withdraw after two years, and that the IMC would then be transformed into an indigenous regulatory agency. This deadline was obviously too short. All circumstances point to the need to continue international presence in the IMC, even if in reduced form. Agreement on this was reached at the latest PIC session in Brussels in May of 2000. Namely, it is feared that premature transfer of the Commission’s responsibilities to the local arena would jeopardize its present authority.

The very structure of the IMC is fairly simple. It consists of the IMC Council, the supreme complaints body, which is at the same time responsible for creating, determining and implementing the IMC strategy and policy, and the Enforcement Panel, responsible for overseeing violations of licensing conditions and of the IMC Broadcast Code of Practice. Both bodies consist of three international members, who are experts on media and regulatory issues, and four local members who represent all constituent peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina and who are prominent figures in the country’s public, cultural and political life. Along with the IMC Council, whose decisions made in complaints procedures are final, and the Enforcement Panel, there is also a Director General and a number of departments: (1) licensing, (2) engineering, (3) monitoring and complaints, (4) legal, (5) public affairs, and (6) administration and finance, plus two regional offices – in Banja Luka and Mostar.

 5.7.2. The IMC as a Specific Source of Media Legislation

The term “regulation” is not a synonym for disciplining the media, nor for interference in their programming policy and editorial concept, and even less a synonym for censorship, as had been imputed to the IMC at the beginning. Its aim is to introduce order and balance in the broadcasting sector.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is beyond doubt the densest frequency networked area in Europe, and according to available information, until recently in the whole world. Only Uruguay is ahead. This required that order be introduced in phases, although the term “introducing order” has provoked public odium.

Phase 1 – issuance of temporary six-month licenses, constituted an inventory of broadcasters (status, transmitter power and other technical modalities). Phase 2 – issuance of long-term licenses (2-5 years), is incomparably more demanding and complex, in particularly with regard to programming criteria, which are stricter for public broadcasting services.

Old, pre-war media legislation was in effect in Bosnia-Herzegovina for a long time. The majority of the old regulations were practically inapplicable, which resulted in a chaotic situation in usage of frequencies. License fees were not paid in BiH before the war. Broadcasters were in state hands. A large number of private stations appeared just before the start of the war and during it, and recently the IMC introduced the obligation of paying for frequencies. The IMC is currently involved in a dispute with the RS Government, which it wants to convince to stop charging taxes, because this duplicates dues paid by the media in that entity. Namely, in addition to the IMC, the local media are also obliged to pay dues to Republika Srpska bodies. As a result of pressure from the IMC and other structures of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the RS information minister resigned in August of 2000, and the department that he headed will probably cease to exist.

The amount of broadcasting compensation charged by the IMC for radio and TV stations is symbolic and ranges from 25 KM to 2,000 KM depending on the media outlet and the power of the broadcasting facility.

After temporary broadcasting licenses were granted to as many as 281 broadcasters, a process of issuing long-term licenses for two to five years started. Conditions for receiving a long-term license are much stricter than those for temporary licenses, for which it was essential to be properly registered and to broadcast on a frequency that does not interfere with other media broadcasting. The IMC accepted the general assessment that Bosnia-Herzegovina has too many media outlets, which its market (and frequency spectrum) is unable to absorb. It is believed that at least 30 percent of the media outlets will be unable to meet the conditions specified by the IMC for receiving a long-term license, due to which the number of broadcasters is expected to be reduced considerably. The condition that the IMC particularly insists on is clear distinction of whether the station is public or privately-owned (commercial). When applying for a long-term license, the station characterizes itself as being public or private, and it is up to the IMC to verify the details given in the station’s characteristics.

The IMC public broadcasting rules characterize as a public broadcaster any radio or TV station that receives 51 percent of its operating support from government institutions and agencies at any level of government, or an organization which itself is owned 51 percent or more by a government agency. The category of public broadcasters includes those that are financed by a political party, as well as those financed by donors from FR Yugoslavia, Croatia and other countries that are not donor-country members of the Peace Implementation Council. This last characterization of a public broadcaster is very interesting and has a strong political motivation. The IMC has a clear stand – private media may be financed only from the West, and any other assistance or donation outside that circle automatically promotes the broadcaster into a public media outlet. In this way OBN and FERN, stations that predominantly achieve public interest programming based on financial support from the international community, are considered commercial stations.

It is clear that the IMC fears, not without ground, that financing coming from Croatia, Yugoslavia or, for example, Islamic countries may be politically motivated and contrary to the political aims of the western community, which bears the biggest burden in maintaining stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Hence, placing media outlets financed by the Bosnian state, or any other non-western state or agency, into the category of public media, which have a bigger obligation to society than private media, is a guarantee that their professional work will be easier to control.

What are the conditions that public media must fulfil? First of all, they must prepare a full accounting of all financial support received and expenditures made, which must be reported to the IMC in intervals. Also, they must constitute Editorial Councils, consisting of four to seven members acceptable to the IMC, who are broadly representative of the political, ethnic, cultural and religious composition of the population which the broadcasters serve. The Council has the role of an advisory body on matters of program content to ensure that it is professionally and media-wise acceptable. It is precisely this program content that will pose a problem for many broadcasters in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At least 40 percent of weekly programming must consist of news and other informative and educational programming (what is usually called public service). The majority of stations that are now considered to be public will hardly be able to meet this requirement.

The IMC specifies another rule that all public broadcasters in Bosnia-Herzegovina must adhere to, which is that one hour of TV programming cannot contain more than four minutes of advertisements. However, both monitored state (public) stations have constantly violated this rule. From May 1 to 28, TV BiH violated this limit 100 times, broadcasting as much as 19.72 minutes of advertisements between 8 and 9 p.m. on May 19. Although it broadcasts less advertisements than TV BiH, TV RS violated the four-minute limit 19 times, broadcasting on May 11 as much as 13.35 minutes of advertisements between 6 and 7 p.m. Some maintain that this obligation for public broadcasters should be redefined and bigger marketing activities allowed. Those opposed to this argument maintain that it would enable public broadcasters to establish monopoly in the advertising market over commercial broadcasters. In any case, Bosnia-Herzegovina is yet awaiting a serious discussion on the dual broadcasting system.

Obligations referring to both private and public broadcasters are related primarily to respect of copyrights and adhering to the IMC Election Code and Broadcast Code of Practice.

The Broadcast Code of Practice calls for fair reporting, without inflammatory language, and programming that does not insult national and religious feeling or the fundamental moral and ethical postulates of society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Broadcasters are obliged to make complete recordings of all programs transmitted by them and to preserve such recordings for 15 days, so that plaintiffs have the opportunity to prove their allegations in case of complaints regarding reporting.

As far as election rules are concerned, all stations in election period are obliged to give equitable access to all political parties. It is interesting that these rules prohibit all paid political advertisements on broadcast media. The reason is the still insufficiently transparent financing of certain political parties and the possibility of unfair competition in election propaganda. Broadcasters maintain that this causes them considerable financial damage.

Newly-established broadcasters compete for frequencies in a competition. The IMC assesses whether allocation of a frequency is justified. For example, if a broadcaster applies for a frequency allowing enough broadcasting power to cover an entire canton, but its programming is not consistent with the character of such a station, the IMC will not approve the frequency. Or, if a broadcaster is allocated a frequency and then abandons the aims specified in its program, the IMC may withdraw its license for that frequency.

It has already become customary for the IMC to fine media for disrespect of guidelines on the character of programming, truthful informing or other aspects of broadcasters’ operation. For example, by a decision of September 8, 2000, the TV station Kanal S was fined with 5,000 KM for broadcasting “false and inflammatory material” on wartime events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and RTVBH for multiple exceeding of advertising program quotas. For similar violations, on this occasion Hrvatska Radio Postaja Mostar and RTV Srebrenica were also fined (Avaz, September 9, 2000, page 9), and the stations TV Erotel from Mostar and BRT Int. from Sarajevo lost broadcasting licenses due to disrespect of IMC rules.

In order to complete this responsible and complex task, it was essential to establish a legal framework, i.e. specific media legislation, which is closer to the common law system than the civil law system. This is primarily manifested in the status and position of the regulatory agency, which must be separate and independent of the executive authorities. Hence, the adjective “independent” is not pure rhetoric, nor a formality. It has essential meaning, although some circles emphasize that the Commission members were appointed by the OHR, which makes the IMC dependent on the High Representative’s policy. It seems, however, that the Independent Media Commission really does operate as an autonomous and independent agency. It has been noticed that the IMC stand to close down Croat television Erotel was decisive, although the OHR was trying to buy time and negotiate.

In the local media community there are different opinions on the justification of the present scope of the IMC mandate. Some maintain that too much competence and power is concentrated in this body (legislative-regulatory, sanctioning and advisory-educational), which may cause counterproductive effects on media freedom. Others maintain that the presence of such a well organized institution in the media field is essential because the local authorities have been unable to pass positive legislation and introduce order in the media space. In any case, optimum development in this sphere should be to create conditions for legislative competences to be transferred to local representative bodies, to establish a local regulatory broadcasting agency, and to support local professional and scientific institutions dealing with media development and education.

Even if it evolves into a nation-wide regulatory agency, the IMC must maintain the attribute “independent,” in the fundamental meaning of the word. As a completely local regulatory agency, it must be independent of state structures and political parties. If a certain component of international supervision (which is now a euphemism for control) remains, this supervision must prevent possible destruction and blockade of the work of the present IMC, i.e. agency which will be part of the domestic administrative-regulatory structure.

 5.7.3. Why Regulation of Broadcasters?

Media deregulation is a general trend in the world. Still, it is more pronounced outside of Europe, especially in the United States. The very term “deregulation” primarily means (1) reducing state intervention or control over the media, and (2) it chiefly refers to the print media. However, even the print media may not be exempted from a certain kind of control, especially if they are propagating war or inciting racial, national, ethnic and religious intolerance or hatred. Articulation of such views through the media is sanctioned under the letter and spirit of national legislation or international documents and instruments binding for all countries.

The situation regarding radio and television stations is essentially different from that regarding the print media. Radio and television stations, being part of the broadcasting media, are the subject of much more pronounced and stricter regulation. Professional, academic, socio-cultural, political and economic discussion has been going on for decades on the effectiveness of regulating the broadcasting media, or more precisely radio and television stations. Despite the many pro et contra, three supposedly important reasons have crystallized on why the terrestrial network should be a subject of state regulation: first, radiowaves are a public commodity, and hence the government, or a specific agency on its behalf, manage this public commodity or resource; second, radiowaves are a limited resource, and the alleged limited character of frequencies is used as the strongest argument in favor of regulation; and last, it is presumed that the broadcasting media are much more influential than the print media.

A so-called traditional argument is also in use, and parallels are drawn with experience regarding the relationship between theater and film. Film, namely, is treated much more cautiously than theater. According to similar analogy, society has tried to amend errors made with regard to unregulated press in favor (or to the detriment) of the overly regulated broadcasting media. This raises a very rational question of how justified it is to treat radio in the same way as television? Aside from media complementarity, aside from industriousness, individual affinities of the public, and even the fact that radio is still the quickest public medium, it is an undisputed fact, in the context of the latter argument (“media influence”), that television is by far a more powerful medium than radio. This casts doubt on the manner of regulation of radio, which is identical to that applied on television stations.

The second argument (“limited resource”) is hardly acceptable in the case of cable television, in which a wide cable system is able to carry 50 or more channels. The situation regarding satellite programming is similar. If, however, we talk about audio and visual digital services of the latest generation, then this supposedly strongest argument collapses. The appearance of web radio and TV, the possibility of broadcasting any event live over the Internet, virtual participation in conferences and similar gatherings held on the other side of the planet, and similar novelties require radical modification and redefinition of the way in which the broadcasting media are regulated.33

The above is a futuristic projection in Bosnian-Herzegovinian circumstances. The reality is different: anarchy rules in the field of classical broadcasting media and therefore priority has been given to the work of a powerful regulatory agency which in this country absolutely has its raison d’etre. Besides, regulatory agencies or similar bodies exist in almost all countries of the world. In some countries, there are even several agencies, such as in Great Britain, where they were actually first started in the late fifties with the appearance of commercial TV stations. Practice differs from one country to the next with regard to regulatory bodies for the field of broadcasting (radio and television stations) and for telecommunications. In some, powers are divided, while in others they are accumulated in one agency, which is what is advocated as the right model to be accepted in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The only specific characteristic of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian media regulatory model is contained in the fact that due to the specific situation in the post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina, this regulatory model was initiated from the outside and is being implemented with the help of international supervision.

6. CLOSING REMARKS

 Five years since the end of the war the media situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina remains unstable. Despite comprehensive intervention on the part of the international community, the media picture has still not been formed, and transition processes are still burdened by the legacy of the war. The general social, political and economic environment in the country and its individual parts is not very stimulating for development of independent and professional media. The media market is still in the bud. The number of media, particularly broadcasters, exceeds the creative and economic resources in Bosnia-Herzegovina and does not correspond with the real interests of the public.

Still, significant progress has been made in media professionalism. Progress in this field is often greater than in the social environments in which the media operate. Inflammatory language has almost disappeared, media barriers have either been broken down or are not as strong as before, and media pluralism is obvious. However, the media continue to be given political significance, be it as an extended arm of national policies and authorities, or as an instrument of democratization of society and implementation of the peace agreement. This is why resources invested by the international community into development of independent media have not resulted in high quality of publishing and broadcasting production, while the delay in restructuring the state broadcasting networks into public services for a long time helped to maintain the dominant influence of the ruling political parties on the public and public opinion.

The local community is completely uninterested in strategic research in this field, and the international community had for a long time satisfied itself with pragmatic solutions characterized by conflict between the higher interests of the most influential countries. Bosnia-Herzegovina does not have a development strategy for the media industry in the professional, media or market sense. The lack of political will to pass contemporary media regulations has been replaced by protectorate-like measures undertaken by the international community. Bosnia-Herzegovina is now moving closer to Europe with such imposed laws, but the state with its representative organs and professional bodies is for the time unable to create and follow through with something on its own.

The next several years will be of key significance for the establishment of a stable media environment. Transfer of responsibility for media development will either become part of systematic communication between the international factors and the local community, or everything achieved over the past five years will catastrophically fail. The Bosnian state and its individual parts must be enabled to pass their own regulations in the spirit of European regulations and standards; international regulatory powers should be transferred into the hands of local bodies and local people with full guarantees that these powers will be used in the interest of professional and free media development. It is essential to create strong ties between the international factors (IMC, OHR, OSCE) and local factors in the media sphere, and also in the fields of education, research and political decision-making in order to create a healthy basis for long-term media development in this country. Only complete integration of the media sphere into local civil society structures and their mutual assistance, will guarantee the appearance of a strong and democratic media arena. Any partial solution will bring a danger of self-destruction.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Babić Duško i Udovičić Zoran, Ljudska prava: priručnik za novinare, Media Plan Institut, Sarajevo, 2000.

Domi, Tanya L., The Media Experts Commission: 1998 Final Report, OSCE Mission to B&H, Sarajevo, 1998. (Also available on the OSCE Mission to B&H Web Site: oscebih.org)

ESI, Reshaping International Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosnian Power Structures, European Stability Initiative, Berlin-Brussels-Sarajevo, 14 October 1999.

Human Rights Watch World Report 1998: Events of 1997, Human Rights Watch, New York-Washington-London-Brussels, December 1997.

ICG- International Crisis Group, Media in Bosnia-Herzegovina: How International Support can be more effective, ICG-International Crisis Group, Sarajevo, March 1997.

Independent Media Commission, White Paper: Media and Democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Independent Media Commission, Sarajevo, 2000 (http://www.mediaonline.ba).

IREX ProMedia, At Risk: Political Intimidation of Journalists and Their Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina - Sources, Effects and Remedies, Draft Discussion Paper by IREX ProMedia, Sarajevo, 10 July 2000.

Jakubowicz, Karol, Freedom vs. Equality, East European Constitutional Review, 1993.

Jakubowicz, Karol, Access to Media and Democratic Communication: Theory and Practice in Central and Eastern European Broadcasting, in Andreas Sajo and Monroe Price edition: Rights of Access to the Media, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996.

Jakubowicz, Karol, Media Legislation as a Mirror of Democracy, Transition, Vol.2, No.21, October 1996.

Jakubowicz, Karol, Civil Society and Public service Broadcasting in Central and Eastern Europe, Javnost/The Public, Vol.3, No.2, 1996.

Jusić Tarik & Media Plan Institute – Monitoring Public Service and Advertising Programming in 8 TV Stations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Media Plan Institute, Sarajevo, July 2000 (Unpublished report)

Jusić Tarik, Media Policies and Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts, in Nenad Dimitrijevic (ed.): ‘Managing Multiethnic Local Communities in the Countries of the FormerYugoslavia’, LGI/OSI Budapest, 2000.

Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,South America, and Post-Communist Europe, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996.

Mareco Index Bosnia, B&H Media Market Monitor, Mareco Index Bosnia, Sarajevo, 2000.

McQuail, Denis, Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction, SAGE Publication: London Thousand Oaks-New Delhi, 1994.

Media Plan Institute, Monitoring Report: The B&H Media in Review, Media Plan and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Sarajevo, Issues: Vol.1, No.5, 3 July / Vol.2, No.2, 5 November / Vol.2, No.3, 20 November / Vol.2, No.4, 18 December, 1996.

Media Plan Institute, ’97 Elections Guide for Journalists in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Media Plan, Sarajevo, August 1997.

OBN Development Fact Sheet, OBN Direction, (Unpublished) Sarajevo, 1998.

OHR, OHR Media Strategy, OHR Sarajevo, 1998a.

OHR, Report of the High representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to the Secretary- General of the United Nations, 14 October 1998, (OHR Web Site: http://www.ohr.int)

Reporters Sans Frontiers, 1997 Report: The Balkan Countries, Balkanmedia, Vol.6, No.1, Spring 1996.

Robinson, Gertrude Joch, Tito's Maverick Media: The Politics of mass Communications in Yugoslavia, University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 1977.

Snyder, Jack and Karen Ballentine, Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas, International Security, Vol.21, No.2, 1996.

Splichal, Slavko, Media Beyond Socialism, Westview Press, Oxford, 1994.

Sucic, Daria Sito, Bosnia's Three Separate Media Systems, Transition, Vol.2, No.21, 18 October 1996a.

Thompson, Mark, Forging War: the media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Article 19, London, 1994.

Udovičić Radenko, BiH – Zemlja sa djelomično slobodnim medijima: Ugrožavanje novinarskih sloboda u BiH, Media Plan Institute, Medijske Novosti br. 61, Sarajevo, 26. juni 2000 (http://www.mediaplan.ba).

Udovičić, Zoran, Dosije: Javni rtv servisi BiH – od ideje do radikalnih rješenja, Media Plan Institut, Novosti o medijima br. 66, Sarajevo, 31. august 2000 (http://www.mediaplan.ba).

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WEB SITES

Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina: http://www.ohr.int

OSCE Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina: http://www.oscebih.org

Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/dayton.html

The Dayton Peace Agreement: The General Framework Agreement: http://www.ohr.int/gfa/gfa-frm.html 

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 [1] Zoran Udovicic is the President of Media Plan Institute Sarajevo. Mehmed Halilovic is Assistant Ombudsman for Media in the Federation of BiH. Tarik Jusic is the Chief Media Analyst at Media Plan Institute Sarajevo and is currently doing his PhD in Mass Media and Communications at the University of Vienna. Radenko Udovicic is a journalist and Editor in Chief of SAFAX News Agency.

 [2] With the outbreak of the war in Bosnia, all relevant political, scientific and cultural factors of the Bosnian Muslims declared with consensus the term Bosniak as the officially, politically and historically correct name for what used to be called the Muslim nation.

 [3] Central Bank BiH, Bulletin 3.

 [4] 1 Convertible Mark (KM) equals 1 Deutsch Mark (DEM).

3 “Financial Times,” December 18, 2000.

4 The peace agreement was clinched on November 28, 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, in the United States, and signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. The agreement was signed by the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, witnessed by the Contact Group member states – United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia – and European Union. special negotiator.

5 The terms ‘international factors’ and ‘international community’ constitute a group of factors which in different ways participate in peace implementation processes, and as such are defined within the Dayton Agreement. The leading factors in these processes are the Peace Implementation Council (made up of the United State, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia), OSCE, UN, NATO and Office of High Representative. The Office of the High Representative – OHR – was established under Annex 10 of the Dayton Agreement and relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The OHR generally supervises the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and possesses powers that make it the highest decision-making body in Bosnia-Herzegovina: among other things, it is empowered to pass or revoke laws and dismiss public officials on all levels. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – OSCE – supervises the implementation of an armament agreement and organizes elections. NATO is here represented by Stabilisation Force (SFOR) that is a NATO-led multinational military force mandated to ensure the implementation of military aspects of the Dayton Agreement and to support the establishment of peace in other ways.

6 See Thompson, Mark, 1994.

8 Research on the size of the market of TV advertisements in Bosnia-Herzegovina was carried out by Media Plan Institute in October/November 2000.

12 Radenko Udovicic, New Public Broadcasting System – Almost From Scratch, Media Online Journal, http://www.mediaonline.ba, October 2000

13 Until 1992, state-owned Radio Television Sarajevo broadcast in Sarajevo (on three radio and two TV channels). When BiH gained independence, it was renamed into Radio Television Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the war, in territories controlled by Serb and Croat forces, Serb RTV and RTV of the Croat Republic of Herceg Bosna were established. RTV BiH, although formally a system intended for the entire country, covers territories with majority Bosniak population. Such ethnic division of the state (public) broadcasting system was retained for a while after the war. The national authorities offered resistance to the restructuring of national broadcasters into public services and their organizational adaptation to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s structure under the Dayton Peace Agreement (a state with two equal entities – Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska) in an effort to maintain their monopolistic political influence on the public. Due to this, the High Representative in 1999 used his powers and passed a decision to restructure the state broadcasters into a public radio television. His latest decision actually makes this decision operational. For a complete dossier on the course of RTV restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-2000), go to www.mediaplan.ba, Media News, no. 66.

14 The building of the present RTVBiH was built in 1984 for the broadcasting center of the XIV Winter Olympic Games in Sarajevo. At that time, its space and equipment made it the most modern such facility in the former Yugoslavia. During the 1992-1995 war, it suffered considerable damage. RTVBiH today does not have money for its maintenance. Most technical capacities are outdated.

15 Radenko Udovicic, “BiH – A Country with Partly Free Media,” Media News, no. 61, June 26, 2000.

16 “Rights and freedoms envisioned by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall be directly applied in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These acts have precedence over all other laws.” – Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Article II, 2.

17 Sarajevo Canton Official Gazette, no. 13, July 23, 1998, Law on Media, Article 23, Subsection 2.

18 “In Croat-majority cantons, this right is expanded to include also editors, publishers, book authors and non-journalist contributors of items. A decision to reveal a source as a rule may only be taken by a responsible court. Unlike others, the Sarajevo law stipulates that the court is allowed to do this only if this will prevent a crime against life.” – Media News, no. 25, January 1999.

19 “Such an approach is a logical consequence of the lack of transparency in the work of the authorities, which thus protect their closed character and the right to favor only certain media and journalists that are inclined to them. This practice is present on almost all levels of government in the Federation and is one of the main ways in which media freedoms are restricted. Punitive measures are specified in such a way that they serve to protect the authorities, not to protect the public and public interest.” – Special Report of the Ombudsmen of the Federation, May 16, 2000.

20 Decision of the High Representative, July 30, 1999.

21 Penal Code of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Official Gazette FBiH, 43/98.

22 Penal Code of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Official Gazette FBiH, Articles 213-216.

23 Penal Code of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Official Gazette FBiH, Articles 213 and 214.

24 Special Report on Freedom of Information and Legal Regulation of Libel and Defamation in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Institution of the Ombudsmen, MH01/99, December 22, 1999.

25 Penal Code of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Article 218.

26 Penal Code of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Article 219.

27 Decision by the High Representative, July 30, 1999.

28 Special Report on Freedom of Information and Legal Regulation of Libel and Defamation in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Institution of the Federation Ombudsmen, December 22, 1999.

29 Special Report on Freedom of Information and Legal Regulation of Libel and Defamation in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Institution of the Federation Ombudsmen, December 22, 1999.

30 The Draft Law on Freedom of Information in Bosnia-Herzegovina, draft laws on freedom of information of the Federation and Republika Srpska, June 28, 2000.

31 Independent Union of Professional Journalists of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Association of Journalists of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Independent Association of Journalists of Republika Srpska, Association of Journalists of Republika Srpska, Syndicate of Professional Journalists of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Association of Croat Journalists in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

32 Press Code, April 29, 1999, Article 1, General Provisions.

33 New Digital Platforms for Audiovisual Services and Their Impact on the Licensing of Broadcasters, Strasbourg Conference, September 13, 2000.

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